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DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES
BEFORE THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEAL:
TRENDS AND ISSUES FOR
CONSIDERATION
Martin Novak
National Institute of Justice
martin.novak@usdoj.gov
1. INTRODUCTION
Though the use of computer forensics in crim-
inal investigations has expanded in recent
years, there is little empirical evidence about
the prevalence of the use of digital evidence
in the court system and its impact on prose-
cutorial outcomes. [1]
The terms digital evidence and computer
forensics are closely related, yet there are
differences. Computer forensics is the uncov-
ering and examination of evidence located
on all electronic devices with digital stor-
age, including computers, cell phones, and
net-works. Though there is no universally ac-
cepted standard for computer forensics, there
are generally accepted practices in place. [2]
In 2014, the Scientific Working Group on Dig-
ital Evidence (SWGDE) published its Best
Practices for Computer Forensics to describe
the best practices for collecting, acquiring,
analyzing, and documenting the data found
in computer forensic examinations. Similar
to other published best practices, it is not a
step-by-step guide nor legal advice, and only
addresses the types of technologies available
at the time of publication.
While computer forensics involves all dig-
ital storage, digital evidence is information
stored or transmitted in binary form that
may be relied on in court. There are count-
less potential sources of digital evidence, in-
cluding text messages, images downloaded
to a computer, a mobile device’s call log,
network access logs, chat sessions, internet
browser history and cache files, passwords,
documents, spreadsheets, and databases.
This paper is an examination of federal
criminal cases before the United States Court
of Appeal in which legal issues were related
to digital evidence. The purpose of this re-
search was to determine the most common
legal basis for appeals relating to the intro-
duction or exclusion of digital evidence, the
frequency with which cases involving an ap-
peal regarding digital evidence affirmed or
reversed for the defense, whether certain chal-
lenges to digital evidence are more prevalent
than others, and whether there are trends
or areas of the law as applied to computer
forensics and digital evidence needing further
attention by the criminal justice system.
The digital evidence produced by com-
puter forensics has the potential to identify
suspects, win acquittal, or obtain a convic-
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tion. Information obtained through digital
evidence can be used to both corroborate and
establish necessary elements of prosecution
and defense cases such as motive, suspect or
witness location, and alibis. Two high-profile
cases anecdotally illustrate both the value of
introducing digital evidence, as well as the
limited value of that evidence in the absence
of clarity and credibility of the forensic meth-
ods used to obtain it.
1.1 Cobb County, Georgia
On September 14, 2014, Ross Harris was
charged with two counts of felony murder
in the death of his son, Cooper Harris. The
Cobb County, Georgia charging documents
stated that Harris maliciously caused the
death of his son by leaving him alone in a
hot motor vehicle with the windows shut on
June 18, 2014. [3] He was also charged with
Criminal Cruelty to a Child and Criminal
Attempt to Commit a Felony.
Investigators were at first puzzled as to
why a seemingly loving father would murder
his child. A forensic examination of a com-
puter, mobile device, thumb drive, external
hard drive, SD card, and DVD – all belong-
ing to Harris – led police to discover the
motive for the murder. Text messages recov-
ered from the computer showed that Harris
was having an affair with a 17-year-old high
school student. Online searches recovered
from his computer demonstrated that Harris
was searching for information on the age of
consent in the State of Georgia and “how to
survive in prison.” Examination of his mobile
device also recovered evidence that Harris
had been “sexting” with several other women
while his son was dying in the overheated car.
On November 14, 2016, Harris was convicted
of murder in the first degree of his son and
sentenced to life without parole.
According to the American Bar Associa-
tion, digital evidence “can have a long-lasting
effect on the court or jurors, regardless of the
reason for being admitted into evidence and
notwithstanding any related jury instructions
as to the limitations of that evidence.” [4]
The kind of effect may depend on the quality
of the evidence presented. Matt McCusker,
of the American Society of Trial Lawyers,
warns that “the average juror does not have
the expertise to differentiate between ’good
science’ and ’junk science,’ so the court must
help them by excluding dubious evidence.” [5]
The murder trial of Casey Anthony, outlined
below, is a case in point.
1.2 Orange County, Florida
On October 14, 2008, Casey Anthony was
indicted by an Orange County, Florida grand
jury with Capital Murder in the First Degree
in the death of her daughter, Caylee Anthony.
Prosecutors alleged that Anthony used chlo-
roform on Caylee, then suffocated her by
covering the girl’s mouth and nose with duct
tape. They also alleged that Anthony put
her daughter’s body in her car trunk before
disposing of it. The child’s skeletal remains
were found in December 2008, less than a
mile from the home of Anthony’s parents.
A computer forensics examiner testified
for the prosecution, stating that someone
had searched the words “chloroform” a total
of 84 times on a computer seized from the
Anthony home. [6] The examiner further
testified that the searches were found in a
portion of the hard drive believed to have
held deleted files. The implication was that
Anthony had made those searches and was
evidence of premeditation.
During his forensic examination of the com-
puter, the examiner used two tools to per-
form the keyword searches that found the
word “chloroform.” While it is generally good
forensic practice to duplicate one’s searches
with multiple tools, in this case, it caused con-
fusion for the jury. The timestamps, which
indicate when a particular search was made,
did not synch between the two tools used.
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This could have easily been explained in that
the tools used different methods to conduct
their respective searches, but the prosecution
gave no such explanation.
The counsel for the defense saw a weakness
in the prosecution’s case and swiftly brought
it to the jury’s attention. Jose Baez, lead
counsel for the defense, stated, “The state’s
computer forensic evidence involving chlo-
roform research, a central element of their
premeditation argument, was used to mislead
the jury and that the flaws in that evidence
infected their entire case like a cancer.” [7]
Anthony was found not guilty on the
charge of capital murder in the first degree on
July 5, 2011. The jury based its decision, in
part, on the lack of credible forensic evidence
linking her to the alleged crime.
These two cases clearly illustrate the power
that digital evidence can have in the disposi-
tion of a case, and raise questions about the
legal precedent regarding digital evidence and
its impact on prosecutorial outcomes. The
next section discusses relevant literature that
has helped inform the debate about computer
forensics and digital evidence.
2. LITERATURE
REVIEW
Although the literature on computer forensics
is somewhat limited, particularly in regard to
courts, there is research that discusses issues
relevant to computer forensics and digital evi-
dence in courts. This literature can be largely
be broken into the three areas of Search and
Seizure, Admissibility, and Precedent. To-
gether, the literature under each topic forms
a foundation of research on which the re-
search questions of this study were built. In
this literature review, each body of literature
is discussed.
2.1 Search and Seizure
Search and seizure allows law enforcement to
search and seize property after obtaining a
warrant based on probable cause. In consid-
ering the prevalence and impact of computer
forensics in the court system, it is important
to consider digital evidence regarding search
and seizure practices. Because it is inher-
ently different from physical evidence, digital
evidence presents a unique set of search and
seizure complications.
As Garfinkel states in Digital Forensics,
electronic storage devices can serve as two
different kinds of digital evidence, each with
its own set of complications. [8] In the first
case, an electronic storage device might con-
tain evidence of a crime that took place in
the physical world, such as murder, rape, or
child molestation. In these cases, the device
is incidental to the crimeit is a vessel that
helped facilitate a crime, but not an object
directly involved in the physical criminal act.
In this case, investigators face the difficulty
that, as Garfinkel states, “Computerization
has made the evidence harder for investiga-
tors to analyze than paper records.” [9]
The second scenario in which an electronic
storage device serves as a form of digital ev-
idence is where it is inherently part of the
crime committed. An example of this is hack-
ing or possession of child pornography. In
these cases, Garfinkel says, “investigators are
often hampered by the technical sophistica-
tion of the systems and the massive amount
of evidence to analyze.” [10]
In both cases, the presence of digital evi-
dence raises important questions about how
search and seizure practices should be ap-
plied. This review examines the literature
around these debates, particularly with re-
gard to Warrants and Plain View.
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2.1.1 Search and Seizure: Warrants
A warrant provides police with the legal au-
thority to conduct a search of physical prop-
erty. However, the concept of warrants was
developed in and for a context of physical
evidence, and its application to digital evi-
dence is complicated. The Fourth Amend-
ment protects against unreasonable search,
but there is debate among scholars with re-
gard to whether and how the rules for search-
ing for digital evidence should be adapted so
as not to violate this protection. This debate
is outlined below.
The scholars Kerr (2005), Rummel (2011),
and Bartholomew (2014) argue that the
search for digital evidence is not a one-step
process, as with physical evidence, but rather
a two-step process. Kerr explains that “the
police first execute a physical search to seize
computer hardware, and then later execute
a second electronic search to obtain the data
from the seized computer storage device.” [11]
Similarly, Ohm (2011) believes that a sec-
ond warrant should be required in order to
meet the particularity requirements of the
Fourth Amendment. Ohm states that this
warrant should “clearly approv[e] the search
of a particular computer’s hard disk or stor-
age media, which is already secured and
seized by the government pursuant to an ear-
lier probable cause search (ideally a first war-
rant) . . . [ensuring that] when a magistrate
approves that search, he or she is aware of
what is being authorized.” [12]
Other scholars have historically disagreed
with this two-step view. Some have argued
that computer searches should be viewed by
the courts in the same manner as the physical
search of documents and other containers of
information, such as a filing cabinet. Clancy
(2005) explains that “a computer is a con-
tainer of containers of documents, that is,
each individual file is a separate container —
just like each manila file in a filing cabinet is
a container — that requires a separate open-
ing to determine what is inside.” [13] Clancy
states that accepting this view does not imply
accepting that a particularized warrant will
become a general warrant. Instead, the rules
that are in place that limit the scope of the
search itself, such as the nature of the crime
or the evidence one expects to find, will allow
the court to determine the sufficiency of the
information provided to them in the warrant
that authorized the search.
In 2015, the Supreme Court offered clarity
with regard to the warrant requirement to
search digital content. In Riley v. California
decision [14], the Supreme Court declared
that the “answer to the question of what po-
lice must do before searching a cell phone
seized incident to an arrest is . . . simple
— get a warrant.” [15] [16] This landmark
ruling closed a debate regarding whether law
enforcement needed to obtain a warrant be-
fore searching for digital evidence.
Although the Supreme Court declaration
established the need for a warrant, ques-
tions remained regarding the details of war-
rants used to collect digital data. Gershowitz
(2015) suggests two approaches for searches
involving cell phones. First, he says that
“judges should impose search protocols that
specify in advance exactly how police should
execute warrants and sift through electronic
data.” [17] In a second method, Gershowitz
suggests that “magistrates should initially re-
strict warrants to a manual search of the
particular functions or applications for which
there is probable cause.” [18] He predicts that
the use of these restrictions will protect the
privacy rights of individuals, prevent the use
of the “good faith” exception, [19] and allow
law enforcement to conduct searches of cell
phones when there is probable cause to do
so.
Similarly to Gershowitz, Huynh (2015) sug-
gests a process-based protocol for the search
of cell phones in which forensic examiners
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must describe the following in warrant appli-
cations: a technical explanation of the search
procedure, an explanation of what is being
sought, the extent of the process being used,
description of the process used to copy the
device for analysis, methods used to isolate
information that is outside of the scope of
the warrant, plans for purging nonresponsive
data, and detail of the access control policies
in place by the examining agency. [20] Huynh
contends that the protocol would enhance the
particularity within a search, and limit the
number of successful defense challenges at
trial.
An additional complication in the applica-
tion of search and seizure principles to dig-
ital evidence relates to the problem of non-
responsive digital data. In Commentary on
the Ganias Case, Kerr (2015) discusses a way
to avoid the problem of over-seizure and the
disposition of non-responsive data. In the
case of paper records that have been seized,
once the non-responsive records have been
filtered, they can easily be returned. This
is not the case with records that exist on
digital media because “[w]e cannot cut off
a piece of the physical hard drive. Even if
we could, data is not stored contiguously on
the medium.” [21] It is simply not possible
to return non-responsive data in a computer
search. This leads to the concern that law
enforcement will use initially non-responsive
data as grounds for future searches unrelated
to the initial search warrant. Kerr’s solution
is to forbid law enforcement from obtaining a
second warrant based on non-responsive data
found in the first warrant. To use the non-
responsive data, Kerr says, “The exclusion-
ary rule would not apply if the government
searched the seized computer under a second
warrant when it could prove by a preponder-
ance that the evidence sought in the second
warrant would have been obtained elsewhere.”
[22]
2.1.2 Search and Seizure: Plain
View
Closely related to the issues of warrants in
collecting and searching digital data is the
issue of the Plain View Doctrine. In a context
of physical evidence, plain view allows a law
enforcement officer to search items found in
plain sight without a warrant. However, the
definition of plain view is complicated in the
context of digital evidence.
Because inculpatory evidence can be hid-
den, obfuscated, or encrypted, law enforce-
ment regularly receives authorizations to
seize large amounts of data. This leads to con-
cerns of over-seizure, and complicates the def-
inition of plain view once data is in the hands
of law enforcement. Angeli et al. (2005) state
that the “seizure and search of electronic data
presents unique challenges and illustrates the
tension between the legitimate law enforce-
ment need to search for and seize evidence,
on the one hand, and the Fourth Amendment
privacy interests of individuals and other en-
tities, on the other.” [23]
The literature presents several views on
the debate of how the concept of plain view
should apply to digital evidence. Some schol-
ars believe that plain view in the traditional
sense should apply to computer searches. [24]
Mantei (2011) states that the “scope of plain
view seizure, like the search itself, is dictated
by the factual circumstances of an investiga-
tion.” He also advises that law enforcement
should seek a second warrant when evidence
is discovered that is not part of the original
warrant. Hood (2011) says that “the inad-
vertent discovery requirement in the context
of plain view seizures of electronically stored
evidence offers the most viable method for
ensuring that government seizures of electron-
ically stored evidence do not become general
or exploratory and comply with the explicit
commands of the Fourth Amendment.” [25]
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Another line of thought among scholars is
that the forensic examination of computers
should be excluded from the plain view doc-
trine. Their reasoning is that some potential
evidence on a computer may not be discover-
able without the use of specialized tools,
such as the contents of a computer’s mem-
ory, metadata, the internet cache, deleted
files, password protected files, file fragments,
and files in unallocated space. This evidence
will never be in plain view. For these rea-
sons, Daniel (2009) concludes that a “targeted
forensic examination should be completely ex-
cluded from the plain view doctrine as it is
an intrusive search and allows the examiner
to see everything on the computer, regardless
of its location or origin.” [26]
A third opinion, expressed by Weinstein
and Drake (2014), is that the federal wire-
tap stat-utes could be applied to computer
searches, thereby protecting the privacy of
individuals and the investigative needs of law
enforcement. Wiretap orders function much
like search warrants, except they allow for the
collection of information as it occurs in real
time (such as phone conversations). There
are a series of procedures that the government
must follow if wiretapping. These procedures
are designed to minimize privacy challenges,
and require the government to minimize the
interception of non-criminal conversations,
report information seized to the judge within
14 days of authorization, and be subject to
ongoing monitoring by the presiding judge.
Applying these wiretap protocols to computer
searches would be a “model for consistent
procedures and judicial oversight.” [27] Em-
ploying these protocols could even provide
an incentive for law enforcement to conduct
searches more efficiently, knowing that the
protocols for reporting are in place.
2.2 Admissibility
The second body of literature relevant to
questions of digital evidence and courts dis-
cusses the issue of admissibility. To be con-
sidered in court, evidence — physical or dig-
ital — must pass the test of admissibility,
which includes consideration of whether the
evidence is relevant, reliable, and not un-
fairly prejudicial. Givens (2004) points to
major differences between electronic and pa-
per evidence that should be addressed when
consid-ering admissibility, using email for his
examples. The first difference is obtainabil-
ity. Givens points out that “without email,
many conversations simply would not exist.”
[28] The second difference is one of availabil-
ity. Email often passes through and is stored
by third-party systems, such that “a simple
search of the third party system could turn
up several ‘deleted’ or otherwise misplaced
files.” [29] Finally, there is a difference in
the content of an email versus a paper docu-
ment. Email contains information not found
in pa-per documents, such as file header infor-
mation, distribution lists, and receipts of ac-
knowledgment. With this knowledge, Givens
says, those offering email as evidence “should
at least be required to present witness testi-
mony to show the reliability of the computer
system used to store or create the electronic
data being offered.” [30]
In Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance
Company, 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. May 4,
2007), [31] Magistrate Judge Paul D. Grimm
(United States District Court for the District
of Maryland) provided the field with guidance
on the admissibility of electronic evidence. In
the ensuing years, the case drew comments
and criticism from legal scholars. According
to the court, when Electronically Stored In-
formation (ESI) is offered as evidence, the
following evidentiary rules must be consid-
ered: relevancy, authenticity, hearsay, best
evidence, and probative value. [32]
Levy-Sachs and Archambault (2008) stated
that “[D]espite the fact that the Court pro-
vides a general roadmap for admissibility of
ESI, the Court does not indicate whether
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more stringent standards are necessary or de-
sirable.” [33] Frieden and Murray (2011) be-
lieve that the methods for authentication pro-
scribed in Lorraine v. Markel are similar to
those of traditional evidence. They state that
though “certain issues, such as authentication,
may be more complicated in the context of
electronic evidence, traditional evidentiary
principles can be consistently adapted to ad-
dress questions regarding the admissibility of
electronic evidence.” [34]
In an article written for the American Bar
Association, Grimm, the presiding judge in
the Markel case, recognizes that some courts
subject electronic evidence “..to far greater
levels of scrutiny than applied to non-digital
evidence when deciding whether to admit it.”
[35] He provides advice for those who con-
sider submitting digital evidence at trial: “If
you identify the digital evidence you want to
use prior to trial, learn as much as possible
about how it works (using the Internet can
be an inexpensive and helpful way to do so),
carefully select which authentication method
you want to use, and (if it involves using
an expert or subpoenaing records) make ar-
rangements sufficiently far in advance to be
prepared at trial, you will greatly enhance
your chances of success.” [36]
2.3 The Daubert Standard
The Daubert Standard requires that the five
factors of testing, peer review, error rate,
standards, and acceptability be applied to
scientific evidence. The Daubert Standard
was promulgated in the landmark Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 579 U.S. 92
(June 28, 1993), which establishes the afore-
mentioned standard for admitting expert sci-
entific testimony in federal court. This ruling
was further expanded in Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 119 U.S. 1167 (Mar. 23, 1999)
[37], which established that the Daubert stan-
dard must be applied to expert testimony
from non-scientists.
Legal scholars have since weighed in on
the Daubert Standard as it applies to digital
evidence as well as the expert witnesses that
testify on that evidence. Meyers and Rogers
(2004) wrote of the need for standards and
certification in the field of computer forensics.
One area of concern noted was the inability
to know the exact functionality of the tools
used in computer forensics. Their observation
that the “majority of the tools and software
used in computer forensics is proprietary and
copyrighted, thus negating the ability to ac-
cess the source code” [38] is still valid today.
They also noted a lack of known error rates
for these same tools. They conclude that,
much like a certified professional accountant,
the field of computer forensics needs meth-
ods that “ensure that the practice is credible
and reliable and that the individuals claiming
to be professionals have met a certain cer-
tification criterion.” [39] In their conclusion,
Meyers and Rogers warn that the “continued
lack of a professional certification, investiga-
tive standards, and peer-reviewed method,
may ultimately result in computer forensics
being relegated to a “junk science,” as op-
posed to a recognized scientific discipline.”
[40]
Atkinson similarly argues for the need to
validate data. According to him, the means
to produce digital evidence are software pro-
grams, for which formal proofs are virtually
nonexistent. These programs are themselves
a sequence of binary digits and are subject
to frequent changes in their code. This leads
to Atkinson to ask: “At what point should a
mess of ones and zeroes be trusted either as
evidence, or to provide it?” [41] To address
these concerns, Atkinson contends that soft-
ware engineers should promote transparency
in the “inner workings” of the tools that pro-
duce digital evidence, providing more oppor-
tunities for validation of tools, and provide
the tools more credibility in court.
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Garfinkel (2010) also grappled with the
lack of known error rates in the field of com-
puter forensics, noting that the “research com-
munity should work to develop digital foren-
sic techniques that produce reportable rates
for error or certainty when they are run.” [42]
Garfinkel also notes the benefit to tool devel-
opers and those evaluating tools for use in
having a standardized set of digital corpora.
This would enable developers to test their
tools with larger data sets and allow others
to replicate their results more easily.
The Daubert Standard also applies to tes-
timony of expert witnesses, Garrie and Mor-
rissy (2014) suggest that a well-written com-
puter forensic report could circumvent the
need for an expert’s testimony altogether. Ac-
cording to the authors, the adequately writ-
ten report should sufficiently detail the meth-
ods used, document the assumptions made
by the computer forensic examiner, the tools
used to complete the forensic exam, elim-
inate any superfluous information, and be
objective in its tone. Finally, the findings in
the report “should be qualified in regard to
the capabilities of the [computer forensics]
tool used in the exam, and the scope of the
investigation.” [43]
2.4 Precedent
The American legal system relies heavily on
the doctrine of stare decisis, which means
to stand by things decided. In an exami-
nation of Supreme Court cases from 1946
through 1995, Spriggs and Hansford (2001)
found that “a precedent is more likely to be
overruled when it is ideologically incongruent
with the preferences of a subsequent Court.”
[44] In other words, conservative precedents
are more likely to be overruled by liberal
courts.
Benesh and Riddick (2002) examined prece-
dent and circuit characteristics to determine
whether a circuit court was likely to follow
Supreme Court precedence. The factors in
their analysis included the unanimity of the
precedent ruling, the complexity of the mat-
ter ruled upon, and the age of the precedent
being overruled. Their results showed that
the circuit courts complied with the over-
ruling of older precedents more quickly than
more recent precedents. However, those same
circuit courts “were more reluctant to comply
with new criminal procedure precedents than
they were precedents in other areas.” [45]
Kassow, et al. (2012) examined the
responsiveness of state supreme courts to
precedents set by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Their methodology included scrutinizing the
treatment of those precedents in the state
court’s opinions to test the value of precedent
strength versus the influence of the ideologi-
cal preferences of the state courts. [46] They
found that the “more the U.S. Supreme Court
reinforced its original precedent with subse-
quent decisions indicating continued support
for the precedent, the more likely state courts
were to provide a positive treatment of the
precedent.” [47]
Re (2016) found that the lower courts may
apply more narrow readings of the federal
court’s precedent. He called this action “nar-
rowing from below.” There are several reasons
lower courts may narrow from below, includ-
ing “to update obsolete precedents, mitigate
the harmful consequences of the Court’s er-
rors, and enhance the transparency of their
decision-making process.” [48] He cites the
following legitimacy conditions that lower
courts consider when narrowing from above:
whether the precedent applies, whether it is
correct, and whether it implicates other le-
gal principles. Re concludes that “narrowing
from below is usually legitimate when lower
courts adopt reasonable readings of higher
court precedent, even though those readings
are not the most persuasive ones available.”
[49]
Alan Butler discusses how the precedent
set in Riley v. California, (134 S. Ct. 2473.
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2014), may affect how lower courts rule on
the issue of how long law enforcement may
collect, search, and store digital data. Butler
begins by pointing out that Riley precedent
“supports the conclusion that the retention
of electronic data should be subject to differ-
ent Fourth Amendment rules than those used
for handling physical evidence, [and that] Ri-
ley would also support a narrower construc-
tion of the ‘plain view’ exception for digital
searches.” [50] He then demonstrates how the
Riley precedent may be interpreted by the
lower courts.
In United States v. Ganias, (F. App. 9706
2nd Cir. 2016), Butler finds that the Sec-
ond Circuit’s ruling that “the government’s
‘seizure and retention’ of digital files beyond
the scope of their 2003 warrant was unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment” [51]
was consistent with the privacy interests ex-
pressed in Riley, and that other courts would
likely follow precedent in this regard.
In United States v. Miller (34 F. Supp.
3d 695), Butler found that the Third Cir-
cuit rejected the defendant’s argument that a
forensic search of his digital camera violated
his rights under the Fourth Amendment. In
this in-stance, the court took a narrower view
of Riley, saying that “the search of a digi-
tal camera is different than the search of a
smartphone because cameras only ‘contain a
limited type of data, restricted to image and
video files that do not touch the breadth or
analysis" from a warrantless search incident
to arrest.’ [52]
Finally, Atkinson (2014) asserts that the
advancement of technology occurs at a rate
that leaves the legal system in a constant
state of trying to catch up. According to
him, the courts depend on precedent “set in
wholly different contexts” that are “reliant
on a digital forensics field still in its infancy.”
[53] While it is essential to review examples
of precedent set in previous cases, we should
also keep in mind that, as Atkinson argues,
these precedents may have been set in a legal
context that is no longer relevant.
Although the literature on the prevalence
and impact of digital evidence in courts is
some-what limited, the bodies of literature
discussing Search and Seizure, Admissibility,
and Precedent does provide a context for the
research this paper undertakes. The existing
literature forms the foundation on which the
research questions of this study were built —
allowing the researcher to ask questions of
the prevalence and impact of digital evidence
in courts.
3. METHEDOLOGY
3.1 Scope
The following analysis is based on a review
of relevant criminal cases in the U.S. Circuit
Courts of Appeal from 2010 through 2015.
The United States circuit courts of appeal
were an ideal sample for this study for two
principal reasons. First, the 11 circuit courts
of appeal and the associated 94 United States
district courts cover the nation. There is at
least one court in each state and the District
of Columbia. Second, the 11 courts of ap-
peals and the 94 district courts adhere to the
same rules of evidence – the Federal Rules
of Evidence. This is important when trying
to compare across or between the 11 circuit
courts of appeal.
3.2 Research Questions and
Objectives
A retrospective study was used to answer the
following research questions:
• What is the most common legal basis
for appeals relating to the introduction
or exclusion of digital evidence?
• How often are cases involving an appeal
regarding digital evidence affirmed or
reversed for the defense?
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• What were the most frequently occur-
ring legal grounds for reversed judgments
for the defense when digital evidence is
involved?
• What was the most frequently occurring
legal ground for affirmed judgments for
the defense when digital evidence is in-
volved?
• Are some of the challenges to com-
puter forensics and digital evidence more
prevalent than others? If so, why?
• Based on the results of this study, are
there trends or areas of the law as ap-
plied to computer forensics and digital
evidence that need further attention?
3.3 Data and Search Terms
Used
Data for this project was drawn from cases
that were affirmed or reversed by the United
States Courts of Appeal for the period 2010-
2015. Cases were identified via LexisNexis,
using the following search terms: Computer,
Computer Forensics, Chat Log, Electronic
Evidence, Cell Phone, Sexting, iPhone, Child
Pornography, Digital Evidence, Computer
Investigation, GPS, and Encryption. Data
was compiled in a Microsoft Access database
and analyzed using Microsoft Excel. [54]
3.4 Cases Excluded
While searching for cases, three categories
of appeals became apparent: Search and
Seizure, Evidence Presented at Trial, and
Other Issues. The digital forensic process
has three major components: Seizure, Acqui-
sition and Analysis, and Reporting. From
Figure 1, we can see that the three compo-
nents of the digital forensic process line up
quite well with the first two categories for
bases of appeal: Search and Seizure and Evi-
dence Presented at Trial. It is also apparent
that the Other Issues category basis of ap-
peals (i.e., Double Jeopardy, Prosecutorial
Misconduct, Sentencing, etc.) have little to
do with either the way the evidence was ob-
tained, or how it was presented in court. For
these reasons, appeals that were based on
“other” issues were excluded from the results
and analysis for this study.
4. RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION
The search parameters mentioned above iden-
tified 145 appeals involving legal issues re-
lated to digital evidence heard by the Unit-
ed States Courts of Appeal for the period
2010-2015.
All of these appeals followed convictions
for federal criminal offenses (see table 6 in
appendices for types of criminal offenses pros-
ecuted). The types of technology where evi-
dence was discovered included desktop com-
puters, laptops, GPS tracking units, mobile
devices, and external storage devices. Of
the 145 appeals included in this study, 138
appeals (95.17 percent) were either affirmed
or reversed for the government. Seven ap-
peals (4.83 percent) were either affirmed or
re-versed for the defense. [55]
In a 2010 article in Judge’s Journal, Clancy
points out that nearly “70 percent of all
re-ported appellate decisions involving the
search or seizure of digital evidence are con-
cerned with the recovery of child pornogra-
phy.” [56] In line with this finding, 89 percent
of appellate decisions in this study were re-
lated to the search and seizure of digital evi-
dence related to the recovery of child pornog-
raphy.
Sufficiency of Evidence was the most fre-
quently occurring legal issue encountered as
a basis for appeal at 31.03 percent, followed
by Probable Cause at 27.59 percent; Defec-
tive Warrants at 12.24 percent; and Defective
Warrants at 12.41 percent. Other legal issues
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Figure 1. Digital Forensic Process Compared to Bases for Appeal
less frequently encountered included Scope
of the Warrant, Probative Value, Expecta-
tion of Privacy, Scientific Merit, Exclusionary
Rule, Relevancy, Authenticity, and Hearsay.
A complete list of legal issues can be found
in Table 2 of Appendix II.
4.1 Legal Issues
The United States District Court Systems ad-
heres to the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE),
first adopted in 1975. [57] The rules regard-
ing the introduction of digital evidence are
similar to that of any other evidence pro-
duced at trial. The legal issues encountered
within the 145 cases in this study were cate-
gorized as Search and Seizure, and Evidence
Presented at Trial. Pertinent FRE Rules or
precedent rulings, along with exemplar cases,
are provided in the following sections that
detail the legal issue argued on appeal, the
reasoning of the court, and the outcome of
the appeal.
4.1.1 Search and Seizure
Probable Cause Digital evidence pro-
duced at trial must have been obtained with
a valid search warrant based on probable
cause to search for evidence of a crime or
criminal activity. The Fourth Amendment
limits the ability of law enforcement agents to
search for evidence. If probable cause cannot
be demonstrated, then evidence will likely
be suppressed under the Exclusionary Rule.
This legal principle was first established by
the United States Supreme Court in 1914 [58]
when the court held that “evidence obtained
by unconstitutional means cannot be used
against a defendant.” [59] Although val-id
warrants have always been generally required
by the courts, there are exceptions that allow
law enforcement to engage in warrant-less
searches. The exceptions include: Detention
Short of Arrest: Stop-and-Frisk [60]; Search
Incident to Arrest [61]; Vehicular Searches
[62]; Vessel Searches; Consent Searches; Bor-
der Searches; “Open Fields” [63]; Plain View
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[64]; Public Schools [65]; Prisons and Regu-
lation of Probation [66]; and Drug Testing.
[67]
In United States v. Schesso, 730 F.3d 1040
(9th Cir. Wash. 2013), the district court
for the Western District of Washington ap-
pealed a district court ruling on the suppres-
sion of evidence gained from a search of the
defend-ant’s home. In ruling to suppress the
evidence, the district court held that “the
affidavit failed to connect generalized state-
ments about child pornography collectors to
Schesso, thus rendering the warrant facially
deficient and the good faith exception inap-
plicable.” [68]
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed this decision determining that “be-
cause there was a fair probability that ev-
idence of child pornography would be found
on the defend-ant’s computer system, the un-
derlying facts supported a finding of probable
cause; that the warrant was not overbroad
and did not raise the risks inherent in over-
seizing that this court considered in United
States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.,
621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010).” [69]
Defective Warrant Defective Warrant
appeals tend to center on the notion of the
staleness of the warrant. In general, “stale
information cannot be used in a probable
cause determination.” [70] Yet, whether infor-
mation in a warrant is stale is dependent in
part by the inherent nature of the crime. For
example, child pornography “is not a fleeting
crime" and "is generally carried out in the
secrecy of the home and over a long period.”
[71] The staleness of a warrant is difficult
to prove with regard to child pornography
because the pornography is stored on comput-
ers, may readily be duplicated, retained indef-
initely, and may well be recovered by forensic
software long after it has been deleted. [72]
In United States v. Hampton, 504 F. App.
402 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2012), Jack Eugene
Hamp-ton appealed his conviction on charges
of receipt of child pornography in violation of
18 U.S.C.S. § 2252(a)(2), and possession of
child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.S.
§ 2252(a)(4)(B). In his appeal, Hampton ar-
gued that the affidavit used to obtain to
search his residence was “stale because the
warrant was executed more than ten months
after German law enforcement officers ob-
served child pornography shared through his
IP address.” [73]
The panel for the Sixth Circuit found that
given “the nature of child pornography and
our prior decisions upholding search warrants
despite similar delays, the ten-month delay
in obtaining a search warrant for Hampton’s
residence did not cause the information to
be-come stale by the time that [United States
Department of Immigration and Customs En-
forcement (ICE) Special Agent] Oberholtzer
requested the search warrant.” [74] Hamp-
ton’s convictions and sentence were affirmed.
Warrantless Seizure The Supreme Court
has consistently held that warrantless seizures
are per se unreasonable, with only a few
specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions. [75] One of those exceptions is
exigent circumstances, which require two con-
ditions: “an objectively reasonable basis for
concluding that the loss or destruction of ev-
idence is imminent; and that governmental
interest being served by the intrusion has
been weighed against the individual interest
that would be protected if a warrant were
required.” [76]
In United States v. Bradley, 488 F. App.
99 (6th Cir. July 12, 2012), Eric J. Bradley
was convicted and sentenced for receiving vi-
sual depictions of minors engaged in sexually
explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. §
2252(a)(2). In his appeal, Bradley contended
“that [Fayette County, Kentucky Investigator]
Bell had seized his computer without obtain-
ing a search warrant and without Bradley’s
Page 12 c© 2020 JDFSL
Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases... JDFSL V14N4
consent and that no exception to the warrant
requirement applied.” [77]
In considering whether the destruction of
evidence was imminent in Bradley’s case, the
panel from the Sixth Circuit stated that “it is
objectively reasonable to seize a container an
officer has probable cause to believe contains
evidence of a crime, rather than leave it un-
guarded in the hands of a suspect who knows
that it will be searched.” [78] The panel also
considered the balance of interests at stake,
stating that “the government’s interest in de-
terring the production and dissemination of
child pornography is significant.” [79] In rul-
ing that exigent circumstances existed and
that the execution of the warrantless seizure
was reasonable, the panel affirmed Bradley’s
conviction and sentence.
Scope of Warrant Under the Fourth
Amendment, search war-rants are required
to describe with particularity to prevent the
seizure of one thing under a warrant describ-
ing another, hence providing the scope of the
warrant. Appeals based on the scope of the
warrant incorporate two is-sues with regard
to particularity: whether the warrant sup-
plies adequate information to guide officers
in selecting what items to seize, and whether
the category of items specified in the warrant
is too broad because it includes articles that
should not be seized. [80] The requirement
for particularity ensures that searches “will
not take the character of the wide-ranging
exploratory searches the Framers intended to
prohibit.” [81]
In United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645
(6th Cir. Feb. 10, 2012), Ovell Evers, Sr.
challenged his conviction and sentence for
production of child pornography, in violation
of 18 U.S.C.S. § 2251(a); possession of child
pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. §
2252(a)(4)(B); and a forfeiture count under
18 U.S.C.S. § 2253. In his appeal, Evers
contended that “although the search warrant
authorized the seizure of his computers, cam-
era, and other electronic media, it did not
authorize a search of the black computer’s
hard drive, and the police therefore unlaw-
fully exceeded the scope of the warrant when
they searched the contents of the computer
with-out obtaining a second warrant.” [82] In
rendering their decision in this appeal, the
panel of judges from the Sixth Circuit noted
that although the search warrant used to ex-
ecute the search of Evers’ home was not a
model of precision, “it cross-referenced [the
investigating officer’s] affidavit, which in turn
recited the underlying factual circumstances
of the alleged sexual crimes, identified the
victim, gave the address of Evers’ residence,
and listed a "Digital Camera, Photo’s [sic],
Personal Computer and accessories" — items
linked by [the victim] to the offenses — as ob-
jects subject to seizure.” [83] In this instance,
the court affirmed both the conviction and
sentence for Evers.
Expectation of Privacy The expectation
of privacy is derived from Katz v. United
States, 389 S. Ct. 347 (Dec. 18, 1967). This
Supreme Court ruling deter-mined that in-
trusion with technology could be classified
as a search, and as such could also result
in an unreasonable search and seizure if the
defendant exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared
to recognize as "reasonable." [84]
In United States v. Wheelock, 772 F.3d
825 (8th Cir. Nov. 20, 2014), Guy Edward
Whee-lock appealed his conviction and sen-
tence for receiving child pornography in vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 2252(a). In this case,
Wheelock was arrested after law enforcement
used in-formation gleaned from an adminis-
trative subpoena to match the defendant to a
computer that downloaded child pornography
us-ing peer-to-peer software. In his appeal,
Wheelock contended that an administrative
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subpoena “violated his Fourth Amendment
privacy interest in the subscriber information
obtained from Comcast.” [85] [86]
In deciding his appeal, the panel from the
Eighth Circuit determined that the investigat-
ing officer requested retrievable information
from Comcast, and demonstrated that “that
the requested records [were] relevant to an
ongoing, legitimate law enforcement investi-
gation of Distribution of Child Pornography.”
[87] Recognizing that this was all that the cur-
rent statute required, the court concluded by
saying that “federal courts in a federal prose-
cution do not suppress evidence that is seized
by state officers in violation of state law, so
long as the search complied with the Fourth
Amendment.” [88] Based on their decision,
the court affirmed Wheelock’s conviction and
sentence.
4.1.2 Evidence Presented at Trial
Sufficiency of Evidence In United States
v. Dixon, 589 F. App. 427 (11th Cir. Oct. 23,
2014), Travis “Rocky” Dixon was convicted of
receiving child pornography and possession
of child pornography, both in violation of
18 U.S.C.S. § 2252(a) (4) (B). Following his
conviction, Dixon contended that the govern-
ment produced insufficient evidence to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty
of downloading the child pornography found
on a computer in his bedroom.
In reviewing his appeal, the panel for the
Eleventh Circuit found that “Dixon’s admis-
sion that he searched for and downloaded
child pornography together with the corrobo-
rating evidence of downloaded child pornog-
raphy found on his computer constituted suf-
ficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude
that Dixon knowingly received and possessed
child pornography.” [89] Dixon’s conviction
and sentence, in this case, were affirmed. In
United States v. Flyer, 633 F.3d 911 (9th
Cir. Feb. 8, 2011), Andrew Flyer appealed
his conviction “in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Arizona under 18 U.S.C.S. §
2252 of attempted transportation and ship-
ping of child pornography, possession of child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. §
2252(a)(4)(B).” [90]
In his appeal, Flyer argued that “there was
insufficient evidence to establish that he ex-
ercised dominion and control over the images
recovered from the unallocated space on the
hard drive. Alternatively, he argues that even
if he could be said to have "possessed" the
images before their deletion, no evidence in-
dicated that the possession occurred during
the time period charged in the indictment.”
[91]
During its review, the panel from the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the gov-
ernment conceded that no evidence was pre-
sented that Flyer knew of the presence of the
contraband images in the unallocated space
on his computer. They also conceded that
Flyer did not have the forensic software nec-
essary to view the files in unallocated space.
Further, there was no evidence that Flyer ever
manipulated the images, and Flyer never ad-
mitted to viewing the charged images. The
government countered that evidence demon-
strating that the charged files were at some
point deleted were sufficient to establish pos-
session. The panel from the Ninth Circuit
disagreed.
In their opinion, the panel noted that
“deletion of an image alone does not sup-
port a conviction for knowing possession of
child pornography on or about a certain date
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.S. § 2252A.
No evidence indicated that on or about April
13, 2004, Flyer could recover or view any of
the charged images in unallocated space or
that he even knew of their presence there.”
[92] Consequently, Flyer’s conviction for pos-
session of child pornography was reversed.
The convictions for attempted shipping of
child pornography and possession of child
pornography on CDs were affirmed.
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Relevancy Digital evidence must be rele-
vant. According to FRE Rule 401, Test for
Relevant Evidence, the evidence is relevant if
“it has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the
evidence; and the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.” [93] However, rele-
vant evidence may be excluded under Rule
403, Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prej-
udice, Confusion, Waste of Time or Other
Reasons, if “its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by a danger of one or more
of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumu-
lative evidence.” [94]
In United States v. Reynolds, 626 F. App.
610 (6th Cir, 2015), Donald Reynolds ap-
pealed his conviction and sentencing for re-
ceipt and distribution of child pornography
in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 2252A(a)(2); and
one count of possession of child pornography,
in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).
Reynolds argued that expert witness testi-
mony based on historical cell-site data lacked
relevancy and that the district court erred in
admitting this evidence.
During a search of his residence on April
7, 2011, agents from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) discovered over 8,000 im-
ages of child pornography on a laptop owned
by Reynolds. Reynolds disputed that he had
downloaded the images, stating that as many
as three other persons living in the house
had access to his laptop, including his two
adult children. The FBI introduced histori-
cal cell-site tracking analysis at trial to assist
in their determination of who was not at
home during the relevant download periods
in their investigation. This information also
did not show that Reynolds was absent from
the home during the same relevant download
periods.
The court determined that the historical
cell phone records were relevant because “it
was probative as to whether each of four per-
sons who generally had access to a desktop
computer was absent from the computer’s
location while child pornography was down-
loaded onto that computer.” [95] According
to the court, the evidence also showed “that
Reynolds’s absence from the residence could
not be demonstrated, permitting an infer-
ence that Reynolds was the only one out of
four house-hold members who was at the resi-
dence during the time child pornography was
down-loaded onto a desktop computer in that
residence.” [96] His conviction and sentence
were thusly affirmed by the panel from the
Sixth Circuit.
Probative Value In United States v. Bal-
lard, 448 F. App. 987 (11th Cir. Dec. 15,
2011), Kenneth Allen Ballard appealed his
conviction for distribution and receipt of child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. §
2252A(a)(2). Ballard argued that the district
court for the Middle District of Alabama had
abused its discretion “by allowing into evi-
dence every image and a portion of the videos
of child pornography that were charged in
the indictment, despite Ballard’s stipulation
that the 15 pictures and three videos were
child pornography.” [97] Ballard contended
that the images unfairly prejudiced the jury
and that the impact of the images off-set
its probative value and should have been ex-
cluded under Rule 403, Excluding Relevant
Evidence.
In considering Ballard’s appeal, the court
noted that FRE Rule 403 is an "extraordinary
remedy which the district court should invoke
sparingly and that the balance should be
struck in favor of admissibility.” [98] In its
decision affirming the District Court’s ruling,
the panel from the Seventh Circuit found
that the “relevant evidence of the images and
videos was not extrinsic to the crime, but was
part of the actual pornography possessed.”
[99]
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Authenticity Digital evidence must be au-
thentic. FRE Rule 901, Authenticating or
Identifying Evidence states that to "satisfy
the requirement of authenticating or iden-
tifying an item of evidence, the proponent
must produce evidence sufficient to support
a finding that the item is what the proponent
claims it is." [100]
To demonstrate the authenticity of digi-
tal data being presented as evidence, such
as a hard drive from a computer or mobile
device, the court must be shown that it “was
acquired from a specific computer and/or lo-
cation, that a complete and accurate copy of
digital evidence was acquired, and that it has
remained unchanged since it was collected.”
[101] In practice, this process is called mak-
ing a forensic image or mirror image, and
is well-understood by the courts. “Making
a mirror image of the hard drive is central
to the examination process and is a routine,
technical step taken by well-trained. . . agents.
It is done to maintain the integrity and secu-
rity of the original evidence. A mirror image
is an exact duplicate of the entire hard drive
and includes all the scattered clusters of the
active and deleted files and slack and free
space. Having such a mirror image of the
hard drive also allows the examiner to recon-
struct the steps of the examination at a later
time.” [102]
A hash value is used to authenticate an
individual file within the mirror image of a
hard drive, or the forensic image file itself.
[103] A hash value is a “unique numerical
identifier that can be assigned to a file, a
group of files, or a portion of a file, based on
a standard mathematical algorithm applied
to the characteristics of the data set . . .
‘Hashing’ is used to guarantee the authentic-
ity of an original data set and can be used as
a digital equivalent of the Bates stamp used
in paper document production.” [104]
Case law has further clarified the issue of
authenticity. In United States v. Siddiqui,
235 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000), the
court stated that a “district court has the dis-
cretion to determine authenticity, and that
determination should not be disturbed on ap-
peal absent a showing that there is no com-
petent evidence in the record to support it.”
In United States v. Lanzon, 639 F.3d 1293
(11th Cir. May 4, 2011), the court stated that
"evidence may be authenticated through the
testimony of a witness with knowledge." [106]
Potential evidence is also subject to the
FRE Rules 1002 and 1003 for Best Evi-
dence. Rule 1002, Requirement of the Origi-
nal, states that “[a]n original writing, record-
ing, or photograph is required in order to
prove its content unless these rules or a fed-
eral statute provides otherwise.” [107]
With regard to digital evidence, this is best
understood in terms of the digital image of
the original evidence that is made for anal-
ysis purposes. The original is not available,
be-cause using it might destroy or alter the
original evidence. Rule 1003, Admissibility
of Duplicates, allows this type of evidence
to be admissible. The rule states that “a
duplicate is admissible to the same extent
as the original unless a genuine question is
raised about the original’s authenticity or the
circumstances make it unfair to admit the
duplicate.” [108]
In United States v. Lebowitz, 676 F.3d
1000 (11th Cir. Apr. 5, 2012), Adam
Lebowitz appealed his convictions for pro-
ducing child pornography in violation of 18
U.S.C.S. § 2251(a), and of attempting to en-
tice a child to engage in unlawful sexual ac-
tivity in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 2422(b).
At trial, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia admitted
into evidence printed transcripts of chat mes-
sages between Lebowitz and a minor whom
he was attempting to engage in illegal sex-
ual activity. In his appeal, Lebowitz argued
that “admission of the printouts violated the
authentication requirement in Federal Rule
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of Evidence 901.” [109] The minor who pro-
duced the printout of the chat sessions in
question testified at trial that these printouts
accurately represent-ed the conversations he
had with Lebowitz, though he could not re-
call when he had produced the printouts.
In forming its opinion, in this case, the
panel relied on previous decisions made by
the Eleventh Circuit in finding that “appellate
courts reviewing a cold record give particular
deference to credibility determinations of a
fact-finder who had the opportunity to see
live testimony.” [110] In so doing, the panel
determined that the district court did not err
in admitting the chat session printouts into
evidence. The conviction and sentence for
Lebowitz were therefore affirmed.
Hearsay Under FRE Rule 801, hearsay is
an out-of-court statement introduced for the
truth of the matter asserted; it applies if the
proponent plans to use the record’s contents
as substantive evidence. [111] Hearsay gener-
ally may not be admitted as evidence. With
regard to digital evidence, the rules regard-
ing Hearsay apply in two ways: email, text
messages, and computer-generated reports
are considered written statements, while dig-
ital video or audio recordings are considered
spoken statements. Regardless, there are
specific documents (in written or electronic
form) that are considered factual, including
computer-generated reports, business records,
family records, and public records.
In United States v. Lizarraga-Tirado, 789
F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. June 18, 2015), the ques-
tion before the Ninth Circuit was whether
a Google Earth satellite image and a digital
tack labeled with GPS coordinates should be
considered hearsay.
On January 17, 2003, while near the Mex-
ican border, Paciano Lizarraga-Tirado was
arrest-ed as a previously removed alien and
charged with illegal re-entry into the United
States under 8 U.S.C.S. § 1326. At trial, the
defend-ant claimed that he was still on the
Mexican side of the border prior to his arrest,
awaiting instructions from a smuggler.
The federal agents that arrested Lizarraga-
Tirado testified to their familiarity with the
border area where they made the arrest and
were sure that they arrested him north of the
border. The agents recorded the GPS coordi-
nates of the arrest on a hand-held device. A
Google Earth satellite image with the GPS co-
ordinates marked was introduced as evidence
at trial. By default, Google Earth marks cer-
tain areas on an image, such as nearby towns,
and bodies of water. The program also of-
fers users two ways to add markers of their
own to the maps it produces. First, a user
can manually add a tack, or digital marker,
to a map, which the user can label. Users
can also type GPS coordinates into Google
Earth, which then automatically creates a
tack at the proper place on the map. Sig-
nificantly, the map introduced as evidence
had the second type of markers produced by
Google Earth.
In considering whether the Google Earth
image was hearsay, the panel “held that a
photograph isn’t hearsay because it makes
no assertion. Rather, a photograph merely
depicts a scene as it existed at a particu-
lar time.” [112] They determined that the
Google Earth program had accurately placed
the tack. In their deliberations, the panel pro-
duced an ex-act replica of the map introduced
at trial, with the GPS coordinates marked
exactly as they were in evidence. Further,
the user of the program has no role in deter-
mining where the marker will be placed on
the map because the Google Earth program
does that work.
The panel stated that “[b]ecause the pro-
gram makes the relevant assertion — that
the tack is accurately placed at the labeled
GPS coordinates — there is no statement
as defined by the hearsay rule. In reaching
that conclusion, we join other Circuits that
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have held that ma-chine statements are not
hearsay.” The defendant’s conviction was sub-
sequently affirmed.
Scientific Merit Since digital evidence
produced by computer forensics is consid-
ered scientific, it must also meet the Daubert
Standard. The standard stems from Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 595 (1993), and has five factors
for judges to determine whether scientific ev-
idence is admissible in court: testing, peer
review, error rate, standards, and acceptance.
The Daubert Standard is also applied to ex-
pert witnesses in federal criminal trials. Un-
der FRE Rule 702, Opinions and Expert Tes-
timony, the court must determine (a) the
ex-pert’s scientific, technical, or other spe-
cialized knowledge will help the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on
sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is
the product of reliable principles and meth-
ods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied
the principles and methods to the facts of
the case.” [115]
In United States v. Stanley, 533 F. App.
325 (4th Cir. July 19, 2013), Paul Stanley ap-
pealed his conviction for receipt, transporta-
tion, and possession of child pornography
in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 2252A(a)(1),
18 U.S.C.S. § 2252A(2), and 18 U.S.C.S.
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), arguing that the district
court erred in admitting expert testimony
from an agent who conducted the forensic
examination of Stanley’s laptop computer.
Stanley argued specifically that Agent Crys-
tal Gilmer of the Maryland State Police “pos-
sessed in-sufficient specialized knowledge or
skill in the software programs used to extract
data from Stanley’s computer, and failed to
offer testimony regarding the reliability of
the forensic tools used in the examination.”
[116]
In examining the pertinent facts, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found
that agent Gilmer was part of a lengthy voir
dire that established her “education, training,
experience, and knowledge of the forensic
tools and procedures she utilized, as well
as detailed explanations of her use of the
forensic software in this particular case.” [117]
During this proceeding, Agent Gilmer also
explained that the tools used to examine the
defendant’s laptop were accepted as a reliable
practice by the Maryland State Police.
In denying Stanley’s appeal, the court
found that the record strongly supported the
determination by the district court of Agent
Gil-more’s competence as an expert and the
reliability of her findings.
4.2 Revisiting the Research
Questions
• What was the most common legal basis
for appeals of computer forensics evi-
dence? For Search and Seizure related
appeals, Probable Cause was the most
common basis of an appeal. For Evi-
dence Presented at Trial, the most fre-
quently occurring basis of the appeal was
Sufficiency of Evidence.
• How often were cases involving an appeal
regarding computer forensics affirmed or
reversed for the defense? Of the cases
included in this study, twelve appeals
(8.16 percent) were affirmed or reversed
for the defense.
• What were the most frequently occur-
ring legal grounds for reversed judgments
for the defense? Out of the 10 reversals
for the defense, five were based on Suffi-
ciency of Evidence.
• What was the most frequently occur-ring
legal ground for affirmed judgments for
the defense? There were two instances of
affirmed judgments for the defense: one
Page 18 c© 2020 JDFSL
Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases... JDFSL V14N4
based on a defective warrant and the
other based on the scope of the warrant.
• Are some challenges to digital evidence
more prevalent than others? If so, why?
The majority of challenges seen in this
study were based on Search and Seizure
issues, rather than the science of com-
puter forensics. The “why” part of the
question is more difficult to discern. This
study only examined appeals from crim-
inal cases heard by the U.S. Courts of
Appeal. Future re-search may involve
an in-depth look at cases at the federal
district court level to examine this issue.
• Based on the results of this study, are
there trends or areas of the law as ap-
plied to computer forensics that needs
further attention? One area of concern
is particularity in regard to the scope
of search war-rants. Particularity gov-
erns how far the government can search
based on a particular factual predicate.
Several important cases with regard to
particularity have been decided by the
courts recently (Riley v. California, 134
S. Ct. 2473 (2014), and United States
v. Ganias, 725 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014).
This issue will continue to be central
to appeals based on Search and Seizure
in general, and those involving digital
evidence specifically.
5. LIMITATIONS
The overall goal for the current study was to
examine the legal basis for appeals related
to digital evidence and the subsequent U.S.
Circuit Courts of Appeal rulings on such ap-
peals. This study surveyed appeals from fed-
eral criminal cases heard before the United
States Courts of Appeal from 2010 to 2015.
Subsequently, new technologies have become
part of the fabric of life, such as storing in-
formation in the cloud, or the Internet of
Things.
Future research should consider how these
newer technologies have affected the legal
landscape. For example, future research
should investigate the impact of Carpenter
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) on
appeals related to probable cause, or the ex-
pectation of privacy. Researchers may want
to consider civil matters before the court with
regard to digital evidence.
Additionally, the methodology for the cur-
rent study included analyzing cases from
Lexus Nexus. As such, the potential bias
of the jurists was outside the scope of the
current study. Future researchers may also
want to consider any potential bias in the
decision making process used by jurists in
rendering their opinions.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Of the 145 cases included in this study, only
22 appeals were based on the science of com-
puter forensics, including probative value, au-
thenticity, hearsay, relevancy, and scientific
merit. In each of those cases, previous rulings
were affirmed. This raises several questions
to contemplate:
Overall, digital evidence does not seem
to play a large role in federal criminal ap-
peals filed within the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
While the search terms used in this study may
have missed some of the cases that would oth-
erwise have been included, the fact that only
147 of the 45,030 federal, criminal cases af-
firmed or reversed for the years 2010 through
2015 raises questions.
• Does digital evidence tend to support
previously supported facts of a particu-
lar case (i.e., corroborative), or is it so
strong as to overbear any evidence to
the contrary (i.e., conclusive)?
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• What is the frequency with which dig-
ital evidence is being admitted in the
U.S. District Courts?
• What are the legal bases for those in-
stances where computer forensics is sup-
pressed as evidence?
• Is computer forensics underutilized as
evidence?
To answer these questions, it will be neces-
sary to more closely examine the trial pro-
ceedings at the U.S. District Court level.
7. NOTES
1. William J. Sabol, "Social Science
Research on Forensic Science: Dear
Colleague Letter from William Sabol,
Fiscal Year 2015," Funding and Awards,
last modified December 5, 2014,
accessed November 13, 2015, http:
//nij.gov/funding/pages/fy15-
dear-colleague-forensics.aspx.
2. Among others, the following organiza-
tions have published “best practices” for
computer forensics: National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and
the National Institute of Justice (NIJ).
3. The State of Georgia v. Justin Ross Har-
ris, Indictment #143124, (Cobb Judicial
District, Georgia Oct. 20, 2014).
4. Zachary G. Newman and Anthony
Ellis, "The Reliability, Admissibility,
and Power of Electronic Evidence,"
American Bar Association - Section of
Litigation, last modified January 25,
2011, https://apps.americanbar.
org/litigation/committees/
trialevidence/articles/012511-
electronic-evidence.html.
5. Matt McCusker, "The Real Danger from
Casey Anthony’s Trial: Scary Scientific
Precedents," Deliberations (blog), entry
posted July 4, 2011, accessed November
19, 2015, http://jurylaw.typepad.
com/deliberations/2011/07/index.
html.
6. Casey Anthony was living at the home
of her parents at the time the murder
was alleged to have occurred.
7. Craig Wilson, "Digital Evidence Dis-
crepancies – Casey Anthony Trial,"
Digital Detective, last modified
July 11, 2011, accessed November
19, 2015, http://www.digital-
detective.net/digital-evidence-
discrepancies-casey-anthony-
trial/.
8. Electronic storage devices include, but
not limited to computers, mobile devices,
and wearable technology
9. Simson L. Garfinkel, "Digital Foren-
sics," American Scientist 101, no.
5 (September/October 2013), http:
//www.americanscientist.org/
issues/pub/digital-forensics.
10. Ibid
11. Orin S. Kerr, "Search Warrants in an
Era of Dig-ital Evidence," Mississippi
Law Journal 75, no. 85 (February 11,
2005)
12. Paige Bartholomew, "Seize First, Search
Later: The Hunt for Digital Evidence,"
Touro Law Re-view 30, no. 4 (2014)
13. Thomas K. Clancy, "The Fourth Amend-
ment Aspects of Computer Searches and
Seizures: A Perspective and a Primer,"
Mississippi Law Journal 75 (2005).
14. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014)
Page 20 c© 2020 JDFSL
Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases... JDFSL V14N4
Figure 2. APPEALS INCLUDED IN THIS STUDY
15. Harvard Law Review, "Riley v. Califor-
nia," Harvard Law Review, last modi-
fied November 10, 2014, accessed April 7,
2017, http://harvardlawreview.org/
2014/11/riley-v-california/.
16. It is important to note that in Riley, the
cell phone was obtained as a result of
a search incident to arrest rather than
through a search authorized by a war-
rant. The warrant requirement estab-
lished in Riley applies to a search of the
contents of a cell phone once the cell
phone is properly obtained (through an
original warrant, search incident to ar-
rest, etc.).
17. Adam M. Gershowitz, "The Post-Riley
Search Warrant: Search Protocols and
Particularity in Cell Phone Searches,"
Vanderbilt Law Review 69, no. 3 (April
2016): 586.
c© 2020 JDFSL Page 21
JDFSL V14N4 Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases...
Figure 3. APPEALS INCLUDED IN THIS STUDY
18. Ibid
19. The good faith exception allows the in-
troduction of evidence that otherwise
would have been excluded for violation
of privacy rights if law enforcement were
acting in good faith when they col-
lected the evidence (i.e., they reasonably
thought their actions were lawful).
20. Andrew D. Huynh, "What Comes after
’Get a Warrant’: Balancing Particularity
and Practicality in Mobile Device Search
Warrants Post-Riley," Cornell Law Re-
view 101, no. 1 (2015): 218.
Page 22 c© 2020 JDFSL
Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases... JDFSL V14N4
Figure 4. APPEALS INCLUDED IN THIS STUDY
21. Orin S. Kerr, "Commentary on the Ga-
nias Case," The Washington Post (Wash-
ington, DC/USA), June 24, 2014.
22. Ibid
23. Angeli, David H., Christina Schuck,
and Avalyn Taylor. "Article: The
Plain View Doctrine and Computer
Searches: Balancing Law Enforcement’s
Investigatory Needs with Privacy Rights
in the Digital Age." The Champion,
Au-gust 2010, 18-24. Accessed April
4, 2017. https://advance.lexis.
com/api/permalink/810a0c0a-462b-
4302-9f92-4db3c87e81e4/?context=
1000516.
24. The plain view doctrine allows a law en-
forcement officer to seize evidence of a
crime, with-out obtaining a search war-
rant, when that evidence is in plain sight.
25. Hood, Nicholas. "No Requirement Left
Behind: The Inadvertent Discovery Re-
quirement—Protecting Citizens One File
at a Time." Valparaiso University Law
Review 45, no. 4 (Summer 2011): 1529-
87.
26. Larry E. Daniel, "Plain View Doc-
trine in Digital Evidence Cases—a
Common Sense Approach," Foren-
sic Magazine, October 23, 2009,
http://www.forensicmag.com/
c© 2020 JDFSL Page 23
JDFSL V14N4 Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases...
Figure 5. SUMMARY TABLES: Summary of Results, By Circuit
Figure 6. Summary Results by Legal Issue
article/2009/10/plain-view-
doctrine-digital-evidence-
cases\%E2\%80\%94-common-sense-
approach
27. Jason Weinstein and William Drake,
"Public Safety, Privacy, and Particular-
ity: A New Approach to Search War-
rants for Digital Evidence," Electronic
Commerce & Law Report 19 (May 7,
2014)
28. J. Shane Givens, "The Admissibility of
Electronic Evidence at Trial: Courtroom
Page 24 c© 2020 JDFSL
Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases... JDFSL V14N4
Figure 7. Summary of Decisions Reversed for the Defense
Figure 8. Summary of Decisions Affirmed for the Defense
Figure 9. Summary of federal offenses
Admissibility Standards," Cumberland
Law Review 34 (2003).
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
Figure 10. Summary of Technologies
31. Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance
Company, 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. May
4, 2007).
32. Ibid, 542.
33. Rebecca Levy - Sachs and Taylor Ar-
chambault, "Hurdling toward the Fu-
ture: Navigating Electronically Stored
Information through the Federal Rules
of Evidence: Lorraine V. Markel
America Insurance Co.," 2008 FDCC
c© 2020 JDFSL Page 25
JDFSL V14N4 Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases...
Winter Meeting; Technology and E-
Commerce/Intellectual Property Sec-
tion, February 29, 2008, accessed April
4, 2017, http://www.thefederation.
org/documents/10.LevySachs.pdf.
34. Jonathan D. Frieden and Leigh M. Mur-
ray, "The Admissibility of Electronic Ev-
idence under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence," Richmond Journal of Law and
Technology XVII, no. 2 (2011)
35. Paul D. Grimm, "Authenticating Digital
Evidence," GP Solo 31, no. 5 (Septem-
ber/October 2014)
36. Ibid.
37. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137 (1999)
38. Matthew Meyers and Marcus Rogers,
"Computer Forensics: The Need for Stan-
dardization and Certification," Interna-
tional Journal of Digital Evidence 3, no.
2 (Fall 2004): 5.
39. Ibid, 10.
40. Ibid, 11
41. John S. Atkinson, "Proof Is Not Binary:
The Pace and Complexity of Computer
Systems and the Challenges Digital Evi-
dence Poses to the Legal System," Birk-
beck Law Review 2, no. 2 (December
2014): 253.
42. Simson L. Garfinkel, "Digital Foren-
sics," American Scientist 101, no. 5
(September/October 2013): [Page
#], accessed March 14, 2017, http:
//www.americanscientist.org/
issues/pub/digital-forensics.
43. Daniel B. Garrie and J. David Mor-
rissy, "Digital Forensic Evidence in the
Courtroom: Under-standing Content
and Quality," Northwestern Journal of
Technology and Intellectual Property 12,
no. 2 (April 2014): 127.
44. James F. Spriggs and Thomas G. Hans-
ford, "Explaining the Overruling of U.S.
Supreme Court Precedent," Journal of
Politics 63, no. 4 (November 2001):
1107.
45. Sara C. Benesh and Malia Reddick,
"Overruled: An Event History Analysis
of Lower Court Re-action to Supreme
Court Alteration of Precedent," Journal
of Politics 64, no. 2 (May 2002): 546.
46. Treatment of precedents may be exam-
ined using Shepard’s Citations. Estab-
lished in 1873, it helps legal scholars
determine the precedential value of a
case through history, evaluates and an-
alyzes what subsequent decisions have
said about the precedent, and traces
the discussion to specific points of law
through the use of head-notes.
47. Benjamin Kassow, Donald R. Songer,
and Michael P. Fix, "The Influence of
Precedent on State Supreme Courts,"
Political Research Quarterly 65, no. 2
(March 18, 2011): 380.
48. Richard M. Re, "Narrowing Supreme
Court Precedent from Below," George-
town Law Journal 104, no. 4 (April
2016): 921.
49. Re, "Narrowing Supreme," 921
50. Alan Butler, "Get a Warrant: The
Supreme Court’s New Course for Digital
Privacy Rights after Riley v. California,"
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law &
Public Policy 10, no. 1 (October 2014):
21.
51. Ibid, 22.
Page 26 c© 2020 JDFSL
Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases... JDFSL V14N4
52. Ibid 24.
53. John S. Atkinson, "Proof Is Not Binary:
The Pace and Complexity of Computer
Systems and the Challenges Digital Evi-
dence Poses to the Legal System," Bir-
beck Law Review 2, no. 2 (December
2014)
54. The status of all cases analyzed in this
study, confirming whether rulings from
that court stood, and whether these rul-
ings received subsequent negative treat-
ment or criticism may found in Appendix
I.
55. For the period 2010 – 2015, there were
45.030 criminal appeals where the out-
come was either affirmed or re-versed
for all United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals (92.2 percent were affirmed for
the government, while 7.8 percent were
reversed for the defendant).
56. Thomas K. Clancy, "Digital Child
Pornography and the Fourth Amend-
ment," Judges’ Journal 49, no. 3 (Sum-
mer 2010): 26.
57. Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 U.S.C. §§
93-595 (1975 & Supp. 2014).
58. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914)
59. "Olmstead v. United States: The
Constitutional Challenges of Pro-
hibition Enforcement — Historical
Background and Documents," History
of the Federal Judiciary, last modified
2016, ac-cessed August 10, 2016, http:
//www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/
page/tu_olmstead_questions.html.
60. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411
(1976)
61. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 392 (1914); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925); Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925)
62. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 158 (1925); Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42 (1970); Arizona v. Johnson,
129 S. Ct. 781, 786 ( 2009); Michigan
Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444 (1990); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976);and City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32
(2000)
63. See 265 U.S. 57 (1924), 466 U.S. 170
(1984), and California v. Greenwood,
486 U.S. 35 (1988)
64. See Steele v. United States, 267 U.S.
498 (1925); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S.
321 (1987); and Illinois v. Andreas, 463
U.S. 765, 771 (1983).
65. See New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325
(1985); and Safford Unified School Dis-
trict #1 v. Red-ding, 129 S. Ct. 2633
(2009).
66. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
526 (1984) for prison cell searches; and
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)
for probation.
67. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Execu-
tives’ Ass’n4, 89 U.S. 602 (1989); and
upheld in National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)
68. United States v. Schesso, 730 F.3d 1040,
(9th Cir. 2013).
69. Ibid.
70. United States v. Frechette, 583 F.3d 374
(6th Cir. Oct. 8, 2009)
71. Ibid.
c© 2020 JDFSL Page 27
JDFSL V14N4 Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases...
72. United States v. Terry, 522 F.3d 645,
650 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008).
73. United States v. Hampton, 504 F. App.
402 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2012)
74. Ibid.
75. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, and United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164.
76. United States v. Plavcak, 411 F.3d 655
(6th Cir. June 6, 2005)
77. United States v. Bradley, 488 F. App.
99, (6th Cir. July 12, 2012)
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid. Citing United States v. Moore,
916 F.2d 1131, 1139 (6th Cir. 1990)
80. United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527
(6th Cir. Tenn. 2011)
81. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192,
196 (1927)
82. United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645
(6th Cir. Feb. 10, 2012)
83. Ibid.
84. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(U.S. Dec. 18, 1967).
85. United States v. Wheelock, 772 F.3d
825 (8th Cir. Nov. 20, 2014)
86. An administrative subpoena under U.S.
law is issued by a federal agency without
prior judicial oversight.
87. United State v. Wheelock.
88. Ibid. Citing United States v. Bach, 310
F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2002).
89. United States v. Dixon, 589 F. App. 427
(11th Cir. Oct. 23, 2014).
90. United States v. Flyer, 633 F.3d 911,
(9th Cir. Feb. 8, 2011)
91. Ibid.
92. United States vs. Flyer 2011.
93. Cornell Law School, "Rule 401. Test for
Rele-vant Evidence," Legal Information
Institute, last modified 2015, accessed
November 13, 2015, https://www.law.
cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_401.
94. Cornell Law School, "Rule 403. Exclud-
ing Rel-evant Evidence for Prejudice,
Confusion, Waste of Time, or Other Rea-
sons," Legal Information Institute, last
modified 2015, accessed Novem-ber 13,
2015, https://www.law.cornell.edu/
rules/fre/rule_403.
95. United States v. Reynolds, 626 F. App.
610 (6th Cir, 2015)
96. 626 F. App. 610
97. United States v. Ballard, 448 F. App.
987
98. Ibid, quoting United States v. Dodds,
347 F.3d 893 (2003)
99. Ibid
100. Cornell Law School, "Rule 901. Au-
thenticating or Identifying Evidence,"
Legal Information In-stitute, last mod-
ified 2015, accessed November 19,
2015, https://www.law.cornell.edu/
rules/fre/rule_901.
101. Eoghan Casey, "Digital Evidence in the
Court-room," in Digital Evidence and
Computer Crime, 3rd ed. (New York,
NY: Elsevier, 2011), 60.
102. United States v. Crim. Triumph Capital
Group, 211 F.R.D. 31 (D. Conn. 2002)
Page 28 c© 2020 JDFSL
Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases... JDFSL V14N4
103. For a discussion on forensic image
file formats, see Forensics File For-
mats, Forensics Wiki, http://www.
forensicswiki.org/wiki/Category:
Forensics_File_Formats.
104. Barbara J. Rothstein, Ronald J.
Hedges, and Elizabeth C. Wiggins,
"Managing Discovery of Electronic
Information: A Pocket Guide for
Judges," Federal Evidence Review, last
modi-fied 2007, accessed March 27, 2017,
http://federalevidence.com/pdf/
2008/09-Sept/FJC\_\%20Managing\
%20Discovery\%20of\%20Electronic\
%20Information.pdf.
105. United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318
(11th Cir. 2000)
106. United States v. Lanzon, 639 F.3d 1293
(11th Cir. May 4, 2011)
107. Cornell Law School, "Rule 1002.
Requirement of the Original," Le-
gal Information Institute, last mod-
ified 2015, accessed November 19,
2015, https://www.law.cornell.edu/
rules/fre/rule\_1002
108. Cornell Law School, "Rule 1003. Admis-
sibility of Duplicates," Legal Information
Institute, last modified 2015, accessed
November 19, 2015, https://www.law.
cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_1003.
109. 109. United States v. Lebowitz, 676
F.3d 1000 (11th Cir. Apr. 5, 2012)
110. 110. Owens v. Wainwright, 698 F.2d
1111, 1113 (11th Cir. 1983)
111. Cornell Law School, "Rule 801. Exclu-
sions from Hearsay," Legal Information
Institute, last modified 2015, accessed
November 13, 2015, https://www.law.
cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule\_801.
112. United States v. Lizarraga-Tirado, 789
F.3d 1107. Also, see United States
v. May, 622 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th
Cir. 1980); wherein Apprehen-sion Data
Cards were not hearsay because they
were not "offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. The
photographs on them were introduced
as circumstantial evidence."
113. Ibid
114. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 524 U.S.
936 (U.S. 1998) extended Daubert to
include any form of technical evidence.
115. Cornell Law School, "Rule 702. Tes-
timony by Expert Witnesses," Le-
gal Information Institute, last mod-
ified 2015, accessed November 13,
2015, https://www.law.cornell.edu/
rules/fre/rule\_702.
116. United States v. Stanley, 533 F. App.
325, (4th Cir. July 19, 2013)
117. Ibid.
118. No subsequent action includes those
cases where US Supreme Court certiorari
was denied
119. Validity questioned in United States v.
Wencewicz, 63 F. Supp. 3d 1238, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151322 (D. Mont. Oct.
24, 2014)
120. Criticized in United States v. Unknown
(In re Unknown), 701 F.3d 749, 2012 U.S.
App. LEX-IS 23802 (5th Cir. Tex. Nov.
19, 2012)
121. United States v. Graves, 951 F. Supp.
2d 758, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90324
(E.D. Pa. June 27, 2013)
122. United States v. Unknown (In re Un-
known), 701 F.3d 749, 2012 U.S. App.
c© 2020 JDFSL Page 29
JDFSL V14N4 Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases...
LEXIS 23802 (5th Cir. Tex. Nov. 19,
2012)
123. United States v. Adams, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 105471 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10,
2016)
REFERENCES
[1] [Special issue]. (2015). Cornell Law Re-
view, 101(1).
[2] Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pend-
ing (Summary), Doc. No. Table 2 ().
Retrieved from http://www.uscourts.
gov/file/19017/download
[3] AmiNarh, J. T., & Williams, P. A.H.
(2008). Digital forensics and the legal
system: A dilemma of our times. Aus-
tralian digital forensics conference.
[4] Angeli, D. H., Schuck, C., & Taylor,
A. (2010, August). Article: The plain
view doctrine and computer searches:
Balancing law enforce-ment’s investiga-
tory needs with privacy rights in the
digital age. The Champion, 18-24. Re-
trieved from https://advance.lexis.
com/api/permalink/810a0c0a-462b-
4302-9f92-4db3c87e81e4/?context=
1000516
[5] Arizona v. Hicks, 480 S. Ct. 321 (1987).
[6] Atkinson, J. S. (2014). Proof is not bi-
nary: The pace and complexity of com-
puter systems and the challenges digital
evidence poses to the legal system. Birk-
beck Law Review, 2(2), 245-261.
[7] Bagley, W. A. (2011). Don’t be evil: The
fourth amendment in the age of google,
national security, and digital papers and
effects. Albany Law Journal of Science
Technology, 21(1), 153-192.
[8] Barbara, J. J. (2012, Septem-
ber 4). Computer forensics stan-
dards and controls. Forensic Mag-
azine. Retrieved from https:
//www.forensicmag.com/article/
2012/09/computer-forensics-
standards-and-controls.
[9] Bartholomew, P. (2014). Seize first,
search later: The hunt for digital evi-
dence. Touro Law Re-view, 30(4), 10.
[10] Benesh, S. C., & Reddick, M. (2002).
Overruled: An event history analysis of
lower court reaction to Supreme Court
alteration of precedent. Journal of Poli-
tics, 64(2), 534-550.
[11] Butler, A. (2014). Get a warrant: The
Supreme Court’s new course for digital
privacy rights after riley v. California.
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law &
Public Policy, 10(1), 83-108.
[12] Casey, E. (2011). Digital evidence in the
court-room. In Digital evidence and com-
puter crime (3rd ed., pp. 49-82). New
York, NY: Elsevier.
[13] Chism v. State of Washington, 661 F.3d
380 (9th Cir. Nov. 7, 2011).
[14] Churchill, M. H., Mauler, D. D.,
McLaughlin, M. J., & Vincent, M. K.
(2015). Admitting and authenticating
electronic evidence in court, including
trial-like demonstrations. The federal
bar association’s 2015 federal litigation
conference, pp. 1-20.
[15] Churchill, M. H., Mauler, D. D.,
McLaughlin, M. J., & Vincent, M. K.
(2015, October 27). Admitting and au-
thenticating electronic evidence in court,
including trial-like demonstrations. Pa-
per presented at The Federal Bar Asso-
ciation’s 2015 Federal Litigation Confer-
ence, Salt Lake City, Utah/USA.
Page 30 c© 2020 JDFSL
Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases... JDFSL V14N4
[16] Clancy, T. K. (2005). The fourth amend-
ment aspects of computer searches and
seizures: A perspective and a primer.
Mississippi Law Journal, 75, 193-272.
[17] Clancy, T. K. (2010). Digital child
pornography and the fourth amendment.
Judges’ Journal, 49(3), 26-32.
[18] Clark, W. (2015). Protecting the priva-
cies of digital life: Riley v. California,
the fourth amendment’s particularity re-
quirement, and search protocols for cell
phone search warrants. Bos-ton College
Law Review, 56(5), 1981-2018.
[19] Cole, K. A., Gupta, S., Gurugubelli, D.,
& Rogers, M. K. (2015). A review of
recent case law related to digital foren-
sics: The current issues. 2015 ADFSL
conference on digital forensics, security
and law, pp. 95-104.
[20] Congressional Research Agency Library
of Congress. (1996). The constitution of
the United States of America: Analysis
and interpretation (Report No. 103–6)
(J. H. Killian & G. A. Costello, Eds.).
Washington, DC/USA: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office.
[21] Court role and structure. (n.d.).
Retrieved February 7, 2017, from
United States Courts web-site: http:
//www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-
courts/court-role-and-structure.
[22] Crocker, A. (2016, June 3). Ap-
peals court avoids hard questions
about the “Collect it all” approach
to computer searches [Blog post].
Retrieved from DeepLinks Blog:
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/06/appeals-
court-avoids-hard-questions-about-
collect-it-all-approach-computer.
[23] Daniel, L. E. (2009, October 23).
Plain view doctrine in digital evi-
dence cases—a common sense ap-
proach. Forensic Magazine. Retrieved
from http://www.forensicmag.
com/article/2009/10/plain-
view-doctrine-digital-evidence-
cases\%E2\%80\%94-common-sense-
approach.
[24] Digital duplications and the fourth
amendment. (2016). Harvard Law
Review, 129(4), 1046. Editorial Board.
(2014). Riley v. California. Harvard
Law Review, 128(1). Retrieved from
http://harvardlawreview.org/
2014/11/riley-v-california/.
[25] Epstein, J. (2016). Child pornog-
raphy and exploitation. In A. Mo-
rosco (Comp.), The prosecution
and defense of sex crimes (Rev.
ed.). Retrieved from https://www.
lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=
9cc0553738975770940ffffafb78ac5a&
csvc=toc2doc&cform=&_fmtstr=
FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&
wchp=dGLbVzk-zSkAl&_md5=
685308ea17f6414e6a924c278fe5dec1.
[26] Expectation of privacy. (2009, Septem-
ber 17). Retrieved December 20, 2016,
from Legal In-formation Institute web-
site: https://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/expectation_of_privacy.
[27] Febus, C., Claude, J., & Singer, K.
(2010, Febru-ary). Understanding prob-
able cause and over-coming staleness is-
sues in child pornography cases. CEOS
Quarterly Newsletter, 9-20.
[28] Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 U.S.C. §§
93-595 (1975 & Supp. 2014).
[29] Frieden, J. D., & Murray, L. M. (2011).
The admissibility of electronic evidence
c© 2020 JDFSL Page 31
JDFSL V14N4 Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases...
under the federal rules of evidence. Rich-
mond Journal of Law and Technology,
XVII (2).
[30] Friess, N. (2013). When rummaging goes
digital: Fourth amendment particularity
and stored e-mail surveillance. Nebraska
Law Journal, 90(4), 972-1016.
[31] Frost, A. (2015). Inferiority complex:
Should state courts follow lower federal
court precedent on the meaning of fed-
eral law? Vanderbilt Law Review, 68,
53-103.
[32] Galves, F., & Galves, C. (2004). Ensur-
ing the admissibility of electronic foren-
sic evidence and enhancing its probative
value at trial. Criminal Justice Magazine,
19(1).
[33] Garfinkel, S. L. (2010). Digital foren-
sics re-search: The next 10 years.
Digital Investiga-tion, 7(Supplemen-
tal), S64-S73. Garfinkel, S. L. (2013).
Digital forensics. Ameri-can Scientist,
101(5), 370. Retrieved from http:
//www.americanscientist.org/
issues/pub/digital-forensics.
[34] Garrie, D. B., & Morrissy, J. D. (2014).
Digital forensic evidence in the court-
room: Under-standing content and qual-
ity. Northwestern Journal of Technology
and Intellectual Prop-erty, 12(2), 121-
128.
[35] Gershowitz, A. M. (2016). The postriley
search warrant: Search protocols and
particularity in cell phone searches. Van-
derbilt Law Review, 69(3), 585-638.
[36] Givens, J. S. (2003). The admissibility
of electronic evidence at trial: Court-
room admissibility standards. Cumber-
land Law Review, 34, 95.
[37] Goldfoot, J. (2011). The physical
computer and the fourth amend-
ment, Berkeley Journal of Criminal
Law, 16(1), 112. Retrieved from
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.
edu/bjcl/vol16/iss1/3.
[38] Goodison, S. E., Davis, R. C., & Jackson,
B. A. (2015). Digital evidence and the
U.S. criminal justice system (Research
Report No. RR-890-NIJ). Santa Monica,
CA: RAND. Grimm, P. D. (2014). Au-
thenticating digital evidence. GP Solo,
31(5), 47-49.
[39] Grimm, P. W., & Brady, K. F.
(n.d.). Admissibility of electronic
evidence [Blog post]. Retrieved
from Drug Device Law Blog:
https://www.reedsmith.com/
files/uploads/DrugDeviceLawBlog/
Electronic_Evidence_-_Admission_
Guide_pdf.pdf#page=1&zoom=auto,-
35,798.
[40] Gruenspecht, J. (2011). "Reasonable"
grand jury subpoenas: Asking for infor-
mation in the age of big data. Harvard
Journal of Law & Technology, 24(543).
[41] Hart, A. (2014, July 26). In court,
digital evidence can shine or fizzle.
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. Re-
trieved from http://www.myajc.
com/news/crime--law/court-
digital-evidence-can-shine-
fizzle/dsdyFH23L3IZZaoTrLYZAO/.
[42] Holley, B. (2010). Digitizing the fourth
amendment: Limiting the private search
exception in computer investigations.
Virginia Law Re-view, 96(3), 677-717.
[43] Hood, N. (2011). No requirement
left behind: The inadvertent discovery
requirement—protecting citizens one file
Page 32 c© 2020 JDFSL
Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases... JDFSL V14N4
at a time. Valparai-so University Law Re-
view, 45(4), 1529-1587. How courts work.
(2016). Retrieved January 15, 2016, from
American Bar Association - Division
for Public Education website: http:
//www.americanbar.org/groups/
public_education/resources/law_
related_education_network/how_
courts_work/appeals.html.
[44] Huynh, A. D. (2015). What comes af-
ter "get a warrant": Balancing particu-
larity and practicality in mobile device
search warrants post-Riley. Cornell Law
Review, 101(1), 187-222.
[45] Jekot, W. (2007). Computer forensics,
search strategies, and the particularity
requirement. University of Pittsburgh
School of Law Journal of Technology
Law and Policy, 7, 1-44.
[46] The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73
U.S.C. § SEC. 35 (1789).
[47] Kassow, B., Songer, D. R., & Fix, M.
P. (2011). The influence of precedent on
state supreme courts. Political Research
Quarterly, 65(2), 372-384.
[48] Katz v. United States, 389 S. Ct. 347
(Dec. 18, 1967). Kerr, O. S. (2003). A
user’s guide to the stored communica-
tions act, and a legislator’s guide to
amending it. George Washington Law
Re-view, 72, 1208-1243.
[49] Kerr, O. S. (2005). Searches and seizures
in a dig-ital world. Harvard Law Review,
119(2), 531-585.
[50] Kerr, O. S. (2005). Search warrants in
an era of digital evidence. Mississippi
Law Journal, 75(85).
[51] Kerr, O. S. (2010). Fourth amendment
seizures of computer data. Yale Law
Journal, 119(4), 700-724.
[52] Kerr, O. S. (2011, June 23). The
historical role of warrants, particularity,
and magistrates [Blog post]. Retrieved
from The Volokh Conspiracy website:
http://volokh.com/2011/06/23/the-
historical-role-of-warrants-
particularity-and-magistrates/.
[53] Kerr, O. S. (2013). Foreword: Account-
ing for technological change. Harvard
Journal of Law and Public Policy, 36,
403-408.
[54] Kerr, O. S. (2014, June 24). Commen-
tary on the Ganias case. The Washing-
ton Post.
[55] Kerr, O. S. (2015). Executing warrants
for digital evidence: The case for use re-
strictions on non-responsive data. Texas
Tech Law Review, 48(1), 1-36.
[56] Knapp, M. (2015, July 6). Second
circuit grants rehearing in United
States V. Ganias [Blog post]. Re-
trieved from Lawfare website: https:
//www.lawfareblog.com/second-
circuit-grants-rehearing-united-
states-v-ganias#.
[57] Kozel, R. J. (2014). The scope of prece-
dent. Michigan Law Review, 113(1), 179-
230.
[58] Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119
U.S. 1167 (Mar. 23, 1999). Lee county
man nets 17 1/2 years in federal
prison for downloading child pornog-
raphy on LimeWire. (2011, January
12). Retrieved March 17, 2017, from
The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the
Middle District of Alabama website:
https://www.justice.gov/archive/
usao/alm/press/2011/2011_01_12_
ballard.html.
c© 2020 JDFSL Page 33
JDFSL V14N4 Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases...
[59] Levy - Sachs, R., & Archambault,
T. (2008). Hurdling toward the
future: Navigating elec-tronically
stored information through the fed-
eral rules of evidence: Lorraine V.
Markel America Insurance co. 2008
FDCC winter meeting; Technology
and e-commerce/intellectual property
section, pp. 6-13. Retrieved from
http://www.thefederation.org/
documents/10.LevySachs.pdf.
[60] Liles, S., Rogers, M., & Hoebich, M.
(2009). [A Survey of the Legal Issues
Facing Digital Forensic Experts]. In G.
Peterson & S. Shenoi (Eds.), Advances
in digital forensics V (Vol. 306, pp. 266-
267). Berlin, Germany: Springer.
[61] Mantei, C. J. (2011). Pornography
and privacy in plain view: Apply-
ing the plain view doctrine to com-
puter searches. Arizona Law Review,
53(3), 985-1012. Retrieved from http:
//arizonalawreview.org/mantei/.
[62] Mestitz, M. (2017). Unpacking digital
containers: Extending Riley’s reasoning
to digital files and subfolders. Stanford
Law Review, 69(1), 321-357.
[63] Meyer, D. L. (2009). MelendezDiaz v.
Massachusetts: What the expanded con-
frontation clause ruling means for com-
puter forensics and electronic discovery.
Temple Journal of Science, Technology
& Environmental Law, 28(2), 243.
[64] Meyers, M., & Rogers, M. (2004). Com-
puter forensics: The need for standard-
ization and certification. International
Journal of Digital Evidence, 3(2). Mey-
ers, M., & Rogers, M. (2005). Digital
forensics: Meeting the challenges of sci-
entific evidence. In S. Shenoi & M. Pol-
litt (Eds.), Advances in digital foren-
sics (pp. 43-50). New York, NY: Inter-
national Federation for Information Pro-
cessing.
[65] Meyers, M., & Rogers, M. (2006, fall).
Computer forensics: The need for stan-
dardization and certification. In M. Pol-
litt & S. Shenoi (Eds.), Advances in dig-
ital forensics (Vol. 194, pp. 42-50). New
York, NY: Springer International Pub-
lishing.
[66] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (June
13, 1966).
[67] Murphy, E. (2014). The mismatch be-
tween twenty-first-century forensic evi-
dence and our antiquated criminal jus-
tice system. Southern California Law Re-
view, 87(3), 633-672.
[68] Nance, K., & Ryan, D. J. (2011).
Legal aspects of digital forensics: A
research agenda. Proceedings of the
44th Hawaii international conference
on system sciences (HICSS-44), pp.
1-6. Newman, Z. G., & Ellis, A.
(2011, January 25). The reliability,
admissibility, and power of electronic
evidence. Retrieved from American Bar
Association - Section of Litigation web-
site: https://apps.americanbar.
org/litigation/committees/
trialevidence/articles/012511-
electronic-evidence.html.
[69] Newman, Z. G., & Ellis, A. (2011,
January 25). The reliability, admissibil-
ity, and power of electronic evidence.
Retrieved March 15, 2017, from Section
of Litigation Trial Evidence web-
site: https://apps.americanbar.
org/litigation/committees/
trialevidence/articles/012511-
electronic-evidence.html.
Page 34 c© 2020 JDFSL
Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases... JDFSL V14N4
[70] Ohm, P. (2005). The fourth amendment
right to delete. Harvard Law Review Fo-
rum, 119, 10-18. Ohm, P. (2011). Mas-
sive hard drives, general warrants, and
the power of magistrate judges. Virginia
Law Review, 97, 1-12.
[71] Olmstead v. United States: The
constitutional challenges of prohibition
enforcement — historical background
and documents. (2016). Retrieved
August 10, 2016, from History of the
Federal Judiciary website: http://www.
fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/
tu\_olmstead\_questions.html.
[72] Re, R. M. (2016). Narrowing Supreme
Court precedent from below. George-
town Law Journal, 104(4), 921-971.
[73] Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473
(2014).
[74] Riley v. California. (2014). Harvard
Law Review, 128(1). Retrieved from
http://harvardlawreview.org/
2014/11/riley-v-california/.
[75] Rothstein, B. J., Hedges, R. J., & Wig-
gins, E. C. (2007). Managing discovery
of electronic in-formation: A pocket
guide for judges. Retrieved March 27,
2017, from Federal Evi-dence Review
website: http://federalevidence.
com/pdf/2008/09-Sept/FJC_\%
20Managing\%20Discovery\%20of\
%20Electronic\%20Information.
pdf.
[76] Rule 801. Exclusions from hearsay.
(2015). Retrieved November 13, 2015,
from Legal In-formation Institute web-
site: https://www.law.cornell.edu/
rules/fre/rule_801.
[77] Rule 401. Test for relevant evidence.
(2015). Retrieved November 13, 2015,
from Legal In-formation Institute web-
site: https://www.law.cornell.edu/
rules/fre/rule_401.
[78] Rule 403. Excluding relevant evidence
for preju-dice, confusion, waste of
time, or other rea-sons. (2015). Re-
trieved November 13, 2015, from
Legal Information Institute website:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/
rules/fre/rule_403.
[79] Rule 901. Authenticating or identify-
ing evidence. (2015). Retrieved Novem-
ber 19, 2015, from Legal Information
Institute website: https://www.law.
cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule\_901.
[80] Rule 1003. Admissibility of duplicates.
(2015). Retrieved November 19, 2015,
from Legal In-formation Institute web-
site: https://www.law.cornell.edu/
rules/fre/rule\_1003.
[81] Rule 1002. Requirement of the original.
(2015). Retrieved November 19, 2015,
from Legal In-formation Institute web-
site: https://www.law.cornell.edu/
rules/fre/rule\_1002.
[82] Rule 702. Testimony by expert witnesses.
(2015). Retrieved November 13, 2015,
from Legal In-formation Institute web-
site: https://www.law.cornell.edu/
rules/fre/rule_702.
[83] Rummel, J. A. (2011). When warrants
uncover digital evidence: The tenth cir-
cuit’s ruling in United States V. burke.
Oklahoma City University Law Review,
36(3), 713-735.
[84] Ryan, D. J., & Shpantzer, G. (2002).
Legal aspects of digital forensics. Pro-
ceedings: Foren-sics workshop.
[85] Salgado, R. P. (2013). Fourth amend-
ment search and the power of the hash.
c© 2020 JDFSL Page 35
JDFSL V14N4 Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases...
Federal Evidence Review. Retrieved
from http://federalevidence.com/
pdf/2013/02Feb/EE-4thAmSearch-
Power\%20of\%20Hash.pdf.
[86] Spriggs, J. F., & Hansford, T. G.
(2001). Explaining the overruling
of U.S. Supreme Court precedent.
Journal of Politics, 63(4), 1091-1111.
Statistical tables for the federal ju-
diciary. (n.d.). Retrieved January
13, 2016, from United States Courts
website: http://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics-reports/analysis-
reports/statistical-tables-
federal-judiciary.
[87] Statistical tables for the federal judi-
ciary - December 2015. (2015, December
31). Retrieved January 17, 2017, from
United States Courts website: http:
//www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
reports/statistical-tables-
federal-judiciary-december-2015.
[88] Statistics & reports. (2015, Decem-
ber). Retrieved December 9, 2015,
from United States Courts web-
site: http://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics-reports. SWGDE digital
& multimedia evidence glossary (Report
No. Version 3.0). (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://www.swgde.org/documents/
Current\%20Documents/SWGDE\
%20Digital\%20and\%20Multimedia\
%20Evidence\%20Glossary.
[89] Thomson, L. L. (2013). Mobile devices:
New challenges for admissibility of elec-
tronic evidence. The SciTech Lawyer,
9(3&4). United States Code, 2006 Edi-
tion, Supplement 5, Title 18 - CRIMES
AND CRIMINAL PRO-CEDURE, 18
U.S.C. § 110 (2006 & Supp. 2011).
[90] United States v. Allen, 625 F.3d 830
(5th Cir. Nov. 4, 2010).
[91] United States v. Ballard, 448 F. App.
987 (11th Cir. Dec. 15, 2011).
[92] United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d
1178 (11th Cir. Aug. 11, 2011).
[93] United States v. Beasley, 688 F.3d 523
(8th Cir. July 31, 2012).
[94] United States v. Beatty, 437 F. App. 185
(3d Cir. July 14, 2011).
[95] United States v. Benoit, 713 F.3d 1
(10th Cir. Apr. 2, 2013).
[96] United States v. Bershchansky, 788 F.3d
102 (2d Cir. June 5, 2015).
[97] United States v. Blauvelt, 638 F.3d 281
(4th Cir. Mar. 9, 2011). 09-4601
[98] United States v. Botta, 405 F. App. 196
(9th Cir. Dec. 8, 2010).
[99] United States v. Bradley, 488 F. App.
99 (6th Cir. July 12, 2012).
[100] United States v. Broxmeyer, 616 F.3d
120 (2d Cir. Aug. 3, 2010).
[101] United States v. Budziak, 697 F.3d
1105 (9th Cir. July 17, 2012).
[102] United States v. Burdulis, 753 F.3d 255
(1st Cir. May 23, 2014).
[103] United States v. Burgos, 786 F.3d 92
(1st Cir. May 13, 2015).
[104] United States v. Burke, 633 F.3d 984
(10th Cir. Feb. 2, 2011).
[105] United States v. Burkhart, 602 F.3d
1202 (10th Cir. Apr. 23, 2010).
[106] United States v. Bush, 727 F.3d 1308
(11th Cir. Aug. 27, 2013).
[107] United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161
(4th Cir. May 5, 2010).
Page 36 c© 2020 JDFSL
Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases... JDFSL V14N4
[108] United States v. Carroll, 750 F.3d 700
(7th Cir. Apr. 29, 2014).
[109] United States v. Chase, 717 F.3d 651
(8th Cir. June 25, 2013).
[110] United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d
265 (1st Cir. July 11, 2012).
[111] United States v. Clark, 668 F.3d 934
(7th Cir. Feb. 13, 2012).
[112] United States v. Clark, 685 F.3d 72
(1st Cir. July 16, 2012).
[113] United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir.
Aug. 26, 2009).
[114] United States v. Connor, 521 F. App.
493 (6th Cir. Apr. 11, 2013).
[115] United States v. Cordero-Rosario, 786
F.3d 64 (1st Cir. May 4, 2015).
[116] United States v. Cotterman, 709 U.S.
952 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 2013).
[117] United States v. Cowan, No. 11-15989
(11th Cir. Nov. 19, 2012).
[118] United States v. Crespo, 645 F.3d 37
(1st Cir. June 8, 2011).
[119] United States v. Crespo-Rios, 645 F.3d
37 (1st Cir. June 8, 2011).
[120] United States v. Curbelo, 726 F.3d
1260 (11th Cir. Aug. 9, 2013).
[121] United States v. Darr, 661 F.3d 375
(8th Cir. Nov. 16, 2011).
[122] United States v. Dawson, 425 F.3d 389
(7th Cir. 2005).
[123] United States v. Diaz, 435 F. App. 329
(5th Cir. July 29, 2011).
[124] United States v. Dixon, 589 F. App.
427 (11th Cir. Oct. 23, 2014).
[125] United States v. Doyle, 650 F.3d 460
(4th Cir. May 23, 2011).
[126] United States v. Dudley, 804 F.3d 506
(1st Cir. Oct. 30, 2015).
[127] United States v. Durdley, 436 F. App.
966 (11th Cir. Aug. 9, 2011).
[128] United States v. Easterwood, 415 F.
App. 883 (10th Cir. Feb. 23, 2011).
[129] United States v. Edens, 380 F. App.
880 (11th Cir. May 26, 2010).
[130] United States v. Edwards, 813 F.3d 953
(10th Cir. Dec. 29, 2015).
[131] United States v. Elbe, 774 F.3d 885
(6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2014).
[132] United States v. Epps, 570 F. App. 197
(3d Cir. June 26, 2014).
[133] United States v. Evans, 802 F.3d 942
(8th Cir. Sept. 18, 2015).
[134] United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645
(6th Cir. Feb. 10, 2012).
[135] United States v. Farlow, 681 F.3d 15
(1st Cir. June 1, 2012).
[136] United States v. Figueroa, 793 F.3d
179 (1st Cir. July 17, 2015).
[137] United States v. Fisher, 745 F.3d 200
(6th Cir. Mar. 7, 2014).
[138] United States v. Flyer, 633 F.3d 911
(9th Cir. Feb. 8, 2011).
[139] United States v. Franz, 772 F.3d 134
(3d Cir. Nov. 4, 2014).
[140] United States v. Frechette, 583 F.3d
374 (6th Cir. Oct. 8, 2009).
c© 2020 JDFSL Page 37
JDFSL V14N4 Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases...
[141] United States v. Fritz, 453 F. App. 204
(3d Cir. Nov. 30, 2011).
[142] United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436
(1st Cir. June 25, 2013).
[143] United States v. Ganias, 725 F.3d 125
(2d Cir. 2014).
[144] United States v. Ganias, 2016 F. App.
9706 (2d Cir. 2016).
[145] United States v. Ganias - second cir-
cuit creates a potential "right to dele-
tion" of imaged hard drives. (2014). Har-
vard Law Review, 128(743). Retrieved
from http://harvardlawreview.org/
2014/12/united-states-v-ganias/.
[146] United States v. Grzybowicz, 747 F.3d
1296 (11th Cir. Apr. 4, 2014).
[147] United States v. Gumbs, 562 F. App.
110 (3d Cir. Mar. 28, 2014).
[148] United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d
1142 (10th Cir. 2005).
[149] United States v. Hampton, 504 F. App.
402 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2012).
[150] United States v. Harrell, 572 F. App.
452 (7th Cir. July 24, 2014).
[151] United States v. Hemetek, 393 F. App.
67 (4th Cir. Aug. 26, 2010).
[152] United States v. Henderson, 595 F.3d
1198 (10th Cir. Feb. 17, 2010).
[153] United States v. Hentzen, 638 F. App.
427 (6th Cir. Aug. 17, 2015).
[154] United States v. Hester, 627 F. App.
867 (11th Cir. Oct. 1, 2015).
[155] United States v. Hoffmann, 74 Military
Justice 542 (N-M.C.C.A. Dec. 11, 2014).
[156] United States v. Houston, 665 F.3d 991
(8th Cir. Jan. 11, 2012).
[157] United States v. Howard, 766 F.3d 414
(5th Cir. Sept. 9, 2014).
[158] United States v. Howe, 545 F. App. 64
(2d Cir. Nov. 24, 2013).
[159] United States v. Hughes, 640 F.3d 428
(1st Cir. Apr. 8, 2011).
[160] United States v. Husman, 765 F.3d 169
(3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2014).
[161] United States v. Johnson, 537 F. App.
717 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 2013).
[162] United States v. Johnson, 579 F. App.
920 (11th Cir. Sept. 16, 2014).
[163] United States v. Johnston, 789 F.3d
934 (9th Cir. May 26, 2015).
[164] United States v. Joubert, 778 F.3d 247
(1st Cir. Feb. 11, 2015).
[165] United States v. Kearney, 672 F.3d 81
(1st Cir. Feb. 29, 2012).
[166] United States v. Keith, 440 F. App. 503
(7th Cir. Oct. 4, 2011).
[167] United States v. Kernell, 667 F.3d 746
(6th Cir. Jan. 30, 2012).
[168] United States v. Killingbeck, 616 F.
App. 14 (2d Cir. Oct. 5, 2015).
[169] United States v. Kinison, 710 F.3d 678
(6th Cir. Mar. 19, 2013).
[170] United States v. Koch, 625 F.3d 470
(8th Cir. Nov. 17, 2010).
[171] United States v. Konn, 634 F. App. 818
(2d Cir. Dec. 17, 2015).
[172] United States v. Kornhauser, 519 F.
App. 41 (2d Cir. Mar. 26, 2013).
Page 38 c© 2020 JDFSL
Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases... JDFSL V14N4
[173] United States v. Krueger, 809 F.3d
1109 (10th Cir. Nov. 10, 2015).
[174] United States v. Krupa, 658 F.3d 1174
(9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2011).
[175] United States v. Landsdown, 735 F.3d
805 (8th Cir. Nov. 7, 2013).
[176] United States v. Lanzon, 639 F.3d 1293
(11th Cir. May 4, 2011).
[177] United States v. Larman, 547 F. App.
475 (5th Cir. Nov. 13, 2013).
[178] United States v. Lebowitz, 676 F.3d
1000 (11th Cir. Apr. 5, 2012).
[179] United States v. Leet, 406 F. App. 830
(5th Cir. Nov. 19, 2010).
[180] United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(July 5, 1984).
[181] United States v. Lizarraga-Tirado, 789
F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. June 18, 2015).
United States v. Lovvorn, 524 F. App.
485 (11th Cir. July 25, 2013).
[182] United States v. Lowe, 795 F.3d 519
(6th Cir. July 28, 2015).
[183] United States v. Lynn, 636 F.3d 1127
(9th Cir. May 31, 2011).
[184] United States v. Majeroni, 784 F.3d 72
(1st Cir. Apr. 27, 2015).
[185] United States v. Manning, 738 F.3d
937 (8th Cir. Jan. 3, 2014).
[186] United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308
(11th Cir. Jan. 29, 2002).
[187] United States v. McClellan, 792 F.3d
200 (1st Cir. July 6, 2015).
[188] United States v. McGlothlin, 391 F.
App. 542 (7th Cir. July 28, 2010).
[189] United States v. McNealy, 625 F.3d 858
(5th Cir. Nov. 5, 2010).
[190] United States v. Merz, 396 F. App. 838
(3d Cir. Oct. 12, 2010).
[191] United States v. Miknevich, 638 F.3d
178 (3d Cir. Mar. 1, 2011).
[192] United States v. Moreland, 665 F.3d
137 (5th Cir. Dec. 14, 2011).
[193] United States v. Myers, 560 F. App.
184 (4th Cir. Mar. 10, 2014).
[194] United States v. Nance, 767 F.3d 1037
(10th Cir. Sept. 23, 2014).
[195] United States v. Needham, 718 F.3d
1190 (9th Cir. June 14, 2013).
[196] United States v. Norman, 448 F. App.
895 (11th Cir. Oct. 4, 2011).
[197] United States v. Oliver, 630 F.3d 397
(5th Cir. Jan. 6, 2011).
[198] United States v. Orisakwe, 624 F. App.
149 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2015).
[199] United States v. Oufnac, 449 F. App.
472 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2011).
[200] United States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651
(3d Cir. Nov. 21, 2012).
[201] United States v. Pelland, 494 F. App.
475 (5th Cir. Oct. 17, 2012).
[202] United States v. Penton, 380 F. App.
818 (11th Cir. May 25, 2010).
[203] United States v. Pickett, 602 F. App.
774 (11th Cir. Mar. 16, 2015).
[204] United States v. Pires, 642 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. Apr. 6, 2011).
[205] United States v. Pirosko, 787 F. App.
358 (6th Cir. July 16, 2015).
c© 2020 JDFSL Page 39
JDFSL V14N4 Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases...
[206] United States v. Plavcak, 411 F.3d 655
(6th Cir. June 6, 2005).
[207] United States v. Price, 582 F. App. 846
(11th Cir. Nov. 14, 2014).
[208] United States v. Pruitt, 638 F.3d 763
(11th Cir. Apr. 13, 2011).
[209] United States v. Ransfer, 749 F.3d 914
(11th Cir. Apr. 14, 2014).
[210] United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d
105 (2d Cir. Mar. 2, 2015).
[211] United States v. Reichling, 781 F.3d
883 (7th Cir. Mar. 27, 2015).
[212] United States v. Reiilly, 662 F.3d 774
(6th Cir. 2011).
[213] United States v. Rendon, 607 F.3d 982
(4th Cir. June 17, 2010).
[214] United States v. Renigar, 613 F.3d 990
(10th Cir. July 13, 2010).
[215] United States v. Reynolds, 626 F. App.
610 (6th Cir. Sept. 11, 2015).
[216] United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d
357 (4th Cir. June 11, 2010).
[217] United States v. Robertson, 560 F. App.
626 (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 2014).
[218] United States v. Roetcisoender, 792
F.3d 547 (5th Cir. July 2, 2015).
[219] United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56 (2d
Cir. Oct. 27, 2010).
[220] United States v. Rose, 714 F.3d 362
(6th Cir. Apr. 18, 2013).
[221] United States v. Russo, 408 F. App.
753 (4th Cir. Jan. 21, 2011).
[222] United States v. Salva-Morales, 660
F.3d 72 (1st Cir. Oct. 31, 2011).
[223] United States v. Schaff, 454 F. App.
880 (11th Cir. Jan. 17, 2012).
[224] United States v. Schesso, 730 F.3d 1040
(9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2013).
[225] United States v. Schwinn, 376 F. App.
974 (11th Cir. Apr. 28, 2010).
[226] United States v. Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d
885 (9th Cir. Aug. 23, 2013).
[227] United States v. Seiver, 692 F.3d 774
(7th Cir. Aug. 28, 2012).
[228] United States v. Sensi, 542 F. App. 8
(2d Cir. Sept. 20, 2013).
[229] United States v. Seymour, 598 F. App.
867 (10th Cir. Mar. 27, 2015).
[230] United States v. Shelabarger, 770 F.3d
714 (8th Cir. Oct. 21, 2014).
[231] United States v. Sims, 603 F. App. 479
(6th Cir. Mar. 9, 2015).
[232] United States v. South, 359 F. App.
960 (11th Cir. Jan. 11, 2010).
[233] United States v. Springstead, 526 F.
App. 168 (4th Cir. Apr. 15, 2013).
[234] United States v. Stanley, 533 F. App.
325 (4th Cir. July 19, 2013).
[235] United States v. Steele, 595 F. App.
208 (4th Cir. Dec. 24, 2014).
[236] United States v. Strausbaugh, 534 F.
App. 178 (3d Cir. Aug. 9, 2013).
[237] United States v. Stringer, 739 F.3d 391
(8th Cir. Jan. 6, 2014).
[238] United States v. Suing, 712 F.3d 1209
(8th Cir. Apr. 10, 2013).
[239] United States v. Syed, 616 F. App. 973
(11th Cir. Sept. 17, 2015).
Page 40 c© 2020 JDFSL
Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases... JDFSL V14N4
[240] United States v. Talley, 392 F. App.
129 (4th Cir. Aug. 9, 2010).
[241] United States v. Terry, 522 F.3d 645
(6th Cir. Apr. 15, 2008).
[242] United States v. Thomas, 788 F.3d 345
(2d Cir. June 11, 2015).
[243] United States v. Trepanier, 576 F. App.
531 (6th Cir. Apr. 13, 2014).
[244] United States v. Vallimont, 378 F. App.
972 (11th Cir. May 11, 2010).
[245] United States v. Vanbrackle, 397 F.
App. 557 (11th Cir. Sept. 22, 2010).
[246] United States v. Vonneida, 601 F. App.
38 (2d Cir. Mar. 2, 2015).
[247] United States v. Walden, 478 F. App.
571 (11th Cir. May 3, 2012).
[248] United States v. Wellman, 663 F.3d
224 (4th Cir. Dec. 7, 2011).
[249] United States v. Westerlund, 477 F.
App. 366 (6th Cir. Apr. 25, 2012).
[250] United States v. Wheelock, 772 F.3d
825 (8th Cir. Nov. 20, 2014).
[251] United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d
511 (4th Cir. Jan. 21, 2010).
[252] United States v. Winkler, 639 F.3d 692
(5th Cir. Apr. 25, 2011).
[253] United States v. Woerner, 703 F.3d 527
(5th Cir. Feb. 22, 2013).
[254] United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp.
2d 104 (2009).
[255] Ward, K. B. (2011). The plain (or not
so plain) view doctrine: Applying the
plain view doctrine to digital seizures.
University of Cincinnati Law Review,
79(3), 1163-1187. https://doi.org/10.
15779/Z38GS5N.
[256] Weinstein, J., & Drake, W. (2014).
Public safety, privacy, and particu-
larity: A new approach to search
warrants for digital evidence. Electron-
ic Commerce & Law Report, 19,
1-6. Who does what - judges. (n.d.).
Retrieved November 10, 2015, from
Inside the Federal Courts web-
site: http://www.fjc.gov/federal/
courts.nsf/autoframe?OpenForm&
nav=menu5a&page=/federal/courts.
nsf/page/304?opendocument.
[257] Wiesenberger, G. (1992). The Supreme
Court and the interpretation of the
federal rules of evidence. Ohio State
Law Journal, 53(5), 1615-1639. Re-
trieved from http://hdl.handle.net/
1811/64620.
[258] Williford v. Texas, 172 2004 Tex.
App 309 (Court of Appeals of Texas,
Eastland 2004). Wilson, C. (2011, July
11). Digital evidence dis-crepancies
– Casey Anthony trial. Retrieved
November 19, 2015, from Digital De-
tective website: http://www.digital-
detective.net/digital-evidence-
discrepancies-caseyanthony-
trial/.
[259] Wilson, C. (2011, July 11). Digi-
tal evidence dis-crepancies: Casey
Anthony trial [Blog post]. Re-
trieved from Digital Detective
website: http://www.digital-
detective.net/digital-evidence-
discrepancies-caseyanthony-
trial/.
[260] Yellon, A. (2009). The fourth amend-
ment’s new frontier: Judicial reasoning
applying the fourth amendment to elec-
tronic communications. Journal of Busi-
ness & Technology Law, 4(2), 411-437.
Zappala, R. A. (2008). Evidence ESI
c© 2020 JDFSL Page 41
JDFSL V14N4 Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases...
and the hearsay rule. 2008 FDCC winter
meeting, pp. 2-5.
Page 42 c© 2020 JDFSL
